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A BLACK CRITIQUE OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
BEVERLY I. MORAN & WILLIAM WHITFORD*

I. INTRODUCTION

This article raises the question of whether the Internal Revenue Code
systematically favors whites over blacks. In recent years a small number
of scholars in the legal academy have become known as critical race
theorists.' One main thrust of critical race theory is a belief that racial
subordination is everywhere, a structural aspect of all parts of American
Professors of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Copyright 0 1996
by Beverly I. Moran.
We would like to thank the University of Wisconsin Graduate and Law Schools
(including the Smongeski Fund) and the Center for Race and Ethnicity at the University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee for helping to fund this project. This work was first presented
in 1991 at a Minority Teacher's Workshop organized by the Association of American Law
Schools. Since that time, Beverly Moran has presented the marriage penalty and home
ownership studies at the University of Chicago, 1994, and the International Academy of
Law and Mental Health in Montreal, 1994. The entire study was last presented by
Beverly Moran and William Whitford at the State University of New York Law School
at Buffalo in 1995. We received valuable comments and suggestions at each occasion.
We have also benefited from helpful comments on a recent draft from: Professors Boris
Bittker; Roy Brooks; Richard Delgado; Howard Erlanger; Hendrik Hartog; David Hill;
Dan Schneider; Franklin Wilson; Hal Winsborough; Ms. Jacqueline Macaulay; and Ms.
Marilyn Brookens.
We owe an indescribable debt to Amon Emeka and Anjeanette M.B. Emeka, Ph.D.
candidates in Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. They conducted the
many regression equations reported in this article and did most of the social science
literature research as well. This project would not have been possible without them. In
the last stages of preparing this article, we received excellent assistance from Tara
Bohling, J.D. 1996, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
The project would not have been possible without all of this assistance, but only we
remain responsible for any errors.
1.
For an overview of critical race theory and theorists, see CRITICAL RACE
*

THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al.

eds., 1995); CRrICAL RACE THEORY: THE CurrINO EDOE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995);
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79
VA. L. REv. 461 (1993).
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society.2 If this part of critical race theory has merit, then every
important American institution should reflect racial subordination, even
such a seemingly neutral institution as the American tax system.
A tax professor's question whetted our interest in the racial neutrality
of the Internal Revenue Code. Responding to Professor Jerome Culp's
article Toward a Black Legal Scholarship,3 which argues that the white
academy has ignored generations of distinct black legal thought, the
professor asked: "Is there a black view on income averaging?" In
context, the professor was obviously attempting to assert the racial
neutrality of tax law.
Our response to this question is that, yes, there is a black view on
income averaging-that it is not very important. Income averaging is an
attempt to right the perceived wrong that due to our system of annual
accounting periods, people with fluctuating incomes are forced to pay
high tax rates when their average income is in fact quite low. 4 When it
existed, income averaging allowed taxpayers with fluctuating incomes to
average their incomes over several accounting periods, thereby placing
themselves in lower tax brackets.' When Congress compressed the
difference between rates in 1986,6 the perceived wrong of high rates
disappeared and Congress repealed income averaging. 7 While the income
of blacks can certainly vacillate-blacks are disproportionately among the
first to be laid off in periods of economic retrenchment,' for
example-most blacks rarely make enough to worry about high tax
rates.9 Consequently, it is likely that blacks rarely used income
averaging. Thus, a Congress oriented solely to the interests of blacks
2.

See Richard Delgado, Critical Race Theory, SAGE RACE RELATIONS

ABSTRACTS, May 1994, at 4-5.

3.

Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship:Race and Original

Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39.
4.
See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A LAW

STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS § 10.01 (7th ed. 1994).
5.
Under former I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305 (1994), if a taxpayer's income in a taxable
year exceeded 140% of his average income for the preceding three years, the excess was
taxed as if it had been earned in equal installments over the four-year span.
6.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101,100 Stat. 2085, 2096-99
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (1994)).
7.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 141,100 Stat. 2117 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. §§ 3(b), 5(b), 6511(d)(2)(B) (1994)).
8.
See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE,
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 108 (1995).

9.
Thirty-nine percent ofblack households survive on incomes of $11,612 or less,
while only six percent of black households bring in "high incomes" of $50,000 or more.
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW

PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 100-01 (1995).
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would never have perceived the original wrong that income averaging was
intended to cure.
Our thinking about income averaging led us to ask how one might
determine whether the tax code is racially discriminatory. Discrimination
connotes that persons who are similarly situated except for race are not
treated similarly.' 0 This definition presupposes, however, some standard
for determining when people are similarly situated. In the context of the
Internal Revenue Code, everyday tax policy analysis provides us a ready
tool for this analysis. In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass," the
Supreme Court defined income as "all accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." 2
Since then generations of tax scholars have used this definition to craft a
conception of a comprehensive income tax base. Our standard for when
persons are similarly situated, therefore, is when they have the same
income, and we too use the Glenshaw Glass definition of income.
Of course, many provisions of the Internal Revenue Code deviate
from the ideal of taxing all income in the comprehensive income tax base.
Sometimes the Code compromises the ideal in order to achieve a more
administratively practical rule. More often, Congress has decided to
encourage particular lifestyles or behaviors by holding out tax benefits as
an incentive. For example, the exclusion of interest on tax free bonds 3
explicitly removes from the tax base "accessions to income, clearly
realized, and over which taxpayers have complete dominion." Congress
has adopted the exclusion to make the purchase of state and local bonds
more attractive to rich taxpayers, and thereby reduce the cost of
borrowing for states and municipalities. 4
Our hypothesis is that deviations from the ideal of a comprehensive
income tax systematically favor whites over blacks. While many studies
about the impact of tax law rely on data from returns, we were unable to
do so because tax returns are not coded by race. In the absence of tax
return data, we have turned to social science studies of the lifestyles and
behaviors of whites and blacks. This evidence will enable us to estimate
what proportion of each group is seemingly eligible for various tax
benefits. We define as a tax benefit any opportunity for deductions or
exclusions from income that deviate from the ideal of a comprehensive
income tax base, or opportunities to postpone reporting income to a time
10.
In tax law this concept is called horizontal equity and is often used in tax
policy analysis. For a discussion of horizontal equity see 1 BORIS 1. BrI'KER, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs § 3.1.4 (1981).

11.

348 U.S. 426 (1955).

12.
13.
14.

Id.at 431.
I.R.C. § 103(a) (1994).
1 BIrrKER, supra note 10, § 15.2.1.
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later than when it should be reported according to the ideal of the
comprehensive tax base. Our evidence about the availability of these tax
benefits to whites and blacks comes both from existing social science
studies conducted for other purposes and from our own analysis of some
important demographic databases. We describe these databases in the
Appendix.
We have limited our study to black/white differences in the
enjoyment of tax benefits, though we recognize that other racial and
ethnic groups in America claim to be systematically subordinated. The
social science data on which we rely is scarce enough for blacks, and
even less available for other groups. We hope future research can extend
our study to other racial and ethnic groups.
In studying the differential enjoyment of various tax benefits, we
look just at the immediate effect of these provisions. We recognize that
the ultimate impact of a tax benefit is uncertain. Tax benefits create
incentives for particular lifestyles and behaviors. As taxpayers respond
to these incentives, the demand, and therefore the market price, for
various things and services rises or falls. For example, if taxpayers have
responded to the various incentives for homeownership by increasing the
demand for homes, the price of homes may have increased. If the price
increase is large enough, taxpayers buying such homes may be no better
off, even with the tax benefits of homeownership, than if the tax benefit
was never enacted.15 However, the marketplace effects of tax benefits
are virtually impossible to measure. We accordingly limit our study to
estimating the differences in the degree to which blacks and whites utilize
tax benefits.
We would like to study the impact of all major tax benefits in the
Code. However, reviewing existing social science data and conducting
our own statistical studies on black/white lifestyle differences is time
consuming and expensive. Limited resources have prevented us from
studying all major tax benefits. In this article we report on the results of
our study of tax benefits in four categories. We cannot reach a
conclusion about whether the Internal Revenue Code as a whole is
systematically biased in favor of whites. Even though we will find
evidence that whites gain more from various tax benefits than blacks,
other tax benefits that we have not studied (such as the earned income
credit)16 may offer greater benefits to blacks. Nonetheless, our study
will test our method-the use of demographic social science studies and
15.
For a discussion of the true value of a tax preference see CHIRELSTEN, supra
note 4, at 361-67.
16.
I.R.C. § 32 (1994) provides a credit to low wage workers against income
taxes otherwise due.
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databases to draw conclusions about the racial impact of various tax
benefits. Furthermore, because we study very important tax benefits, and
find them systematically biased in favor of whites, we add credibility to
our hypothesis with respect to the Code as a whole. We hope to later
extend our study to other tax benefits.
The tax benefits that we have studied fall into four broad categories:
(1) Some benefits granted to wealth and wealth transfers,
specifically the exclusion of gifts; 17 basis adjustment
rules at the time of gift and at death; reduced rates
for capital gains;19 and various aspects of the
realization requirement for determining the timing of
income.
(2) Four benefits of homeownership, specifically the home
mortgage interest deduction;' the real property tax
deduction; 2 the rollover of gains on the sale of a
principal residence; ' and the one time exclusion of
$125,000 of gain on the sale of a principal residence
by a person over fifty-five years of age.'
(3) Several employee benefits, specifically Keogh
plans;' IRAs;' employer provided pensions;'
and employer provided health insurance.'
(4) The different tax rate treatment of single and married
persons, which is sometimes called the "marriage
penalty."

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.
I.R.C.

§ 102(a).
§§ 1014(a), 1015(a).
§ I(h).
§ 163(h)(1), (h)(2)(D).
§ 164(a)(1).
§ 1034(a).
§ 121(a)-(b).
§ 401(c).
§§ 219, 408.
§§ 401(a)(1), 501(a).
§ 106.

HeinOnline -- 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 755 1996

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

A. Critical Race Theory and Method
Critical race theory has generated heated debates about method. In
particular, critical race theorists' use of narrative has sparked
controversy?2 For us, narrative is a powerful and worthwhile method.
Narrative allows one person to experience another person's life in an
intimate and meaningful way. For example, Patricia Williams is well
known for her ability to reach whites with her stories of everyday black
life. When Professor Williams writes about being denied entrance to a
store because of her race,2 she opens this experience to whites in an
intimate way that statistics cannot replicate.
Narrative also allows the use of ridicule and exaggeration to expose
situations that are otherwise ignored. For instance, Professor Derrick
Bell often uses such devices as a means of exposing society's faults.
When Professor Bell writes about licensing white people to
discriminate,' or when he writes about whites selling blacks to aliens
from outer space,31 he exposes a black American truth-the tenuous
status of blacks on these shores.
Thus narrative has its place within critical race theory. But our
primary interest in critical race theory is its substantive theory of racial
subordination, not its methods. In our view, hostile critics of critical race
theory have placed too much emphasis on the use of narrative, and not
enough emphasis on the theory of systematic racial subordination in
American society. Our use of social science methodology will prevent
individuals from avoiding our conclusions by attacking narrative as a
method.
B. Use of Controls
In studying racial subordination, we had to decide whether we were
interested solely in the differential impact of tax benefits by race, or
whether we were interested in the differential impact by race after
28.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others:A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of Schoolk An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807
(1993) (arguing that although stories "can play a useful role in legal scholarship," they
should be evaluated by the same standards as traditional scholarship).
29.
-PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991).
30.

DERRICK L. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE

OF RACISM 47-64 (1992).
31.
Id. at 158-94.
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controlling for income and other indicants of socio-economic status (SES).
We decided that we were interested in both. It is commonly assumed that
blacks cluster in the lower economic classes, and that most tax benefits
favor the wealthy more than the poor. If these assumptions are correct,
it follows that tax benefits in the Internal Revenue Code directly benefit
whites as a group more than blacks. But our version of the racial
subordination theory is stronger than this.
We believe that even if income is held constant, the Internal Revenue
Code systematically disfavors the financial interests of blacks. We
believe that, even at the same incomes, the typical black and the typical
white lead different lives, largely as a result of the American history of
racial subordination. These different lives, we hypothesize, trigger
different tax results.
Because we want to test the stronger version of our hypothesis, we
have always controlled for income in our analysis of the social science
data. A more difficult decision has been whether to control for other
indicants of socio-economic status as well. Many social scientists engaged
in race relations research believe that by controlling for as many SES
characteristics as possible, the effect of race in human relationships is
minimized or eliminated entirely. Minimizing the effect of race is
appropriate when a study is interested in the influence of skin color alone.
We do not hypothesize, however, that blacks pay more taxes because tax
administrators respond to skin color (though that may happen), but rather
because blacks are more likely to have lifestyles that are less advantaged
by tax benefits. As a result, for our purposes controlling'for all possible
SES characteristics would constitute nothing more than defining in
nonracial terms the very lifestyles that cause blacks to be disadvantaged
by the tax code.32
At the same time we are concerned that if we only control for
income, some readers will dismiss our findings as not truly driven by
racial differences. Furthermore, much of the quantitative social science
literature concerning black/white lifestyle differences uses controls in
addition to income in order to isolate the effects of race. We rely
extensively on this literature in our analysis and will report on its use of
controls.
In doing our own data analysis, we have adopted a compromise
position. We have analyzed data about lifestyle differences using race and
income alone as relevant categories, but we have also analyzed and will
report about black/white lifestyle differences after controlling for a limited
32.
As the Yiddish saying goes: "If your grandmother had balls, she would be
your grandfather."
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number of additional characteristics of SES. In the Appendix, we report
in detail on the controls used in our data analyses.
C. The Significance of Our Work
For the most part we reserve our conclusions until we have presented
the data. But we must address preliminarily the potential significance of
a finding of systematic racial subordination in the Internal Revenue Code.
If these findings have no significance, then there is no point to conducting
our study.
First, we want to make clear that we are not asking a question about
discriminatory intent. We do not hypothesize that members of Congress
set out to harm blacks through the Internal Revenue Code. Nonetheless,
in America a gap exists between blacks and most lawmakers because
many whites and blacks do not interact in any meaningful way.
Legislators are affected by this social segregation. Black life remains
largely unknown to most of the white world, and to most white
legislators. Hence legislators are largely unaware of the Internal Revenue
Code's impact on blacks. We believe that this ignorance is one of the
reasons for structural racial subordination in America.
Second, although we cannot possibly come to a definitive conclusion
about the entire Internal Revenue Code, we will present evidence
suggesting that certain provisions benefit whites more than blacks. If the
Code as a whole reflects racial subordination, we believe such a finding
has value as social science. It would offer support for the basic
substantive theory of critical race theory-that racial subordination is
everywhere.
However, as lawyers concerned with racial justice in America, we
also believe that if the Internal Revenue Code systematically subordinates
black interests, then Congress should change it. To develop possible
changes, we have invented a metaphor of a Black Congress that is
exclusively oriented to the interests of blacks as a group. We will suggest
changes in the Internal Revenue Code that such a Congress might
consider. Because no change should be enacted without consideration of
the Code as a whole, and because we studied a limited number of
provisions, we make no final recommendations. Our suggestions should
not only stimulate interest in possible reforms, but also illustrate how the
actual Congress, largely unaware of black lifestyles, might have created
a Code that systematically subordinates black interests.
We next present our evidence about how the provisions that we
studied have different impacts on blacks and whites. Afterwards we will
elaborate on our conclusions.
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II. WEALTH

A. Tax Benefits
We looked at four code sections that protect wealth, both while the
original owner holds it and when the original owner passes it on to other
people, usually younger family members. These four provisions are the
Section 1014 basis adjustment, the Section 1 reduced rate for capital gains
income, the Section 102 exclusion for gifts and the Section 1015 gift
basis. In addition, we considered two unwritten rules that work to benefit
wealth-the realization requirement and tax-free financing.
Each of these sections and rules allow taxpayers with wealth to avoid
income taxes that would be due under the Glenshaw Glass goal of taxing
all "accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion." 33 These provisions are relevant to our topic
of black/white differences in tax benefits for two reasons. First, on
average blacks own less assets than whites.' Second, to maximize the
tax benefits of many of these provisions an individual needs not only to
own property, but to own the right types of property. As we will show,
the small percentage of blacks who do own assets are likely to own the
wrong type of assets to maximize tax benefits. 5
We discuss each of the provisions before turning to analysis of their
racial impact. Investments in home equity are an important category of
wealth, but because special tax provisions pertain to them, we reserve our
discussion of this form of wealth until the next section.3
1. REALIZATION AND REFINANCING

When a taxpayer earns a salary, his increase in wealth is immediately
subject to tax.37 In contrast, when many assets appreciate in value in
their owners' hands, the increased value is not immediately taxed. A
nonstatutory rule called "realization" determines the time of taxation.3
33.
348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
34.
See discussion of the social science literature and our results infra pp. 766,
769-70, 771-72.
35.
See discussion of the social science literature and our results infra pp. 767-68,
770-72.
36.
See infra p. 775.
37.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1994).
38.
For a discussion of the realization requirement see CInRELSTEIN, supra note
4, § 5.01-.05; Beverly 1.Moran, One Tax Piece of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Can the
FederalHome Loan Bank Board Use the Internal Revenue Code to Bail Out the Ailing
Savings and Loan Industry?, 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 351, 359-63 (1991).
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A multitude of rules determine when realization occurs with respect to
different assets. For example, interest on bank accounts (both checking
and savings, including certificates of deposit requiring a penalty for early
withdrawal) is realized when it accrues and is immediately taxed. 9 But
appreciation in the value of stock, real estate, and many other assets is not
deemed to be realized until there is a "sale or exchange. " '
The realization requirement often permits taxpayers to delay paying
the tax on an accession to wealth. Delayed taxation is usually
advantageous to a taxpayer because he can then invest the resources that
would otherwise have gone to taxes. Further, if realization occurs only
after a sale or exchange, the taxpayer has considerable control over the
timing of taxation, and can plan to realize the accession to wealth in a
year in which he has little other income, or even an excess of realized
losses, thereby avoiding taxation at higher rates or altogether.
From the taxpayer's perspective, one problem with the realization
requirement is that, in order to obtain its benefits, the taxpayer must often
hold onto his property. Fortunately for those with assets to spare, the
Code provides several ways around this limitation. Most importantly, the
taxpayer can exploit the principle that borrowed monies are not income
because the corresponding obligation to repay means there is no accession
to wealth.4 Taxpayers with appreciated property can borrow against
that appreciation without having a realization event. By using the
borrowed funds, wealthy taxpayers can enjoy property appreciation
without a corresponding tax cost. There are other ways to accomplish
this objective as well. For example, some swaps of property are
considered "like kind" exchanges, which the statute exempts from
immediate recognition of untaxed appreciation. 2
2. SECTION 1014 BASIS ADJUSTMENT

When a taxpayer owns the type of property for which appreciation
in value is not recognized in the year in which it occurs, the taxpayer can
avoid liability for the appreciation altogether by owning the property until
death. Section 1014 provides that the heir of property acquires a basis in
the inherited property equal to its fair market value at the time of the
decedent's death. Any previously untaxed (because "unrealized")
appreciation in the value of the property escapes tax altogether. This is
39.
I.R.C. § 61(a)(4).
40.
I.R.C. § 1222.
41.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 3.01.
42.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031(a), 1034(a). For a discussion of like kind
exchanges see CHRmLS'TEIN, supra note 4, § 15.01-02.
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true even if the decedent enjoyed the benefit of that appreciation by, for
example, using the property as collateral for a loan.
In order for a taxpayer to obtain Section 1014's benefits, the type of
property involved is crucial. First, Section 1014 only benefits property
that has appreciated in value. Property that has declined in value receives
a stepped down basis on the owner's death, and thus nobody takes a
deduction for the lost value. Second, even if the property appreciates,
Section 1014 only benefits those who inherit property with unrealized
gains. Bank accounts can appreciate as they accumulate interest but that
interest is realized and taxed each year. When the heirs receive the
contents of those already-taxed accounts, there is no built in-yet
untaxed-gain for Section 1014 to protect.
3.

CAPITAL GAINS

If a taxpayer sells appreciated property prior to death, he must pay
tax on the appreciation. However, if the property is a "capital asset,"
that accession to wealth may be taxed at favorable capital gains rates.'
Essentially, the capital gains rate is a special (lower) rate of tax on the
sale of investment property as opposed to the common (higher) rate on
"ordinary" income. Avoiding technical detail, ordinary income consists
of such items as salary, dividends and interest, while capital gains come
from the sale or exchange of capital assets such as stocks and real
estate."
The practical result of the difference between "ordinary
income" and "capital gains" is that the highest rate of federal tax on
ordinary income is 39.6% while the highest capital gains rate is 28%.'
Although some argue that Congress should lower or repeal the capital
gains tax,' the more than forty percent increase in tax from 28% to
39.6% is enough to keep wealthy taxpayers focused on the capital gains
rate.
43.
See I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1221, 1222. Section 1222 divides capital gains and losses
into two classes: 1) long-term arising from the sale or exchange of capital assets held for
more than one year; 2) short-term arising from the sale or exchange of capital assets held
for one year or less. Net long-term gains are treated preferentially, while net short-term
gains are taxed at ordinary rates. Section 1245 limits the ability of taxpayers to receive
capital treatment on the sale of business assets whose cost has been recovered through
depreciation deductions from ordinary income. A taxpayer's gain on the sale of his
property is taxed as ordinary income to the full extent of his prior depreciation deductions.
44.
For a discussion of the definition of capital asset see CHIRELSTEIN, supra note
4, § 17.01-05.
45.
I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d), (h).
46.
See, e.g., Jack Kemp, Lower Taxes, HigherRevenues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1996, at D15; Floyd Norris, Ringing in an Answer to a Tax Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1995, at Cl.
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Owning the right kind of property is crucial to capital gains
treatment. First, preferential treatment goes only to property that
produces a gain on sale. Depreciated properties, such as cars and real
estate in inner city slum neighborhoods, are disfavored if they are capital
assets because a taxpayer is often unable to deduct losses resulting from
these properties.' Further, the capital gains rate only applies when the
property is of a type where its appreciation is not immediately realized."
Finally, the taxpayer must hold the property for investment rather than for
sale to customers." Thus investors are favored over small businessmen.
As we will see, all these requirements have adverse effects on blacks
because they disfavor the very assets that blacks tend to own.
4. GiFrs
Surely an extra $5000 received without an obligation to repay is an
"accession to wealth." Yet, under Section 102 this $5000 (or $50,000 or
$500,000) escapes income taxation if it meets the Code's "gift" definition.
Under Commissionerv. Duberstein, a transfer with no obligation to repay
constitutes a "gift" for tax purposes only if it results from the donor's
"detached and disinterested generosity."'
In combination with other
rules, the net result of the "detached and disinterested generosity"
requirement is that gifts from strangers (such as prizes and awards) are
usually taxed."1 In contrast, gifts from family members and friends
commonly receive the Section 102 exclusion. Moreover, wealthy people
generally count other wealthy people as their family and friends, while
low-asset individuals can only hope to get wealth transfers from strangers
and lotteries. The gift exclusion under Section 102 thus favors the more
fortunate both because wealthy individuals have access to more gifts and
because they have access to the "right" gifts.

47.
Capital losses are generally deductible only to the extent that they offset
capital gains. In the case of a noncorporate taxpayer, up to $3000 of capital losses in
excess of capital gains can be deducted from ordinary income. Any capital loss balance
is carried forward into succeeding taxable years where it can be applied against capital
gains (and to a lesser extent against ordinary income) in each succeeding year until fully
utilized. I.R.C. §§ 1211(b), 1212(b) (1994).
48.
For example, the capital gains rate does not apply to appreciating bank
accounts.
49.
I.R.C. § 1221(1).
50.
363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243,
246 (1956)).
51.
See I.R.C. § 74 (including in gross income amounts received as prizes and
awards). But see I.R.C. § 117 (excluding from gross income amounts received as a
qualified scholarship).
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This emphasis on the right gifts only increases when we consider the
rules in Section 1015 that govern the donee's basis in gifts. Under
Section 1015 the donee takes the donor's basis so long as the gift has
appreciated in value. This provision allows a high bracket donor to
arrange for gains to be taxed at the rates applied to a donee, who may be
selected for the gift because of his low bracket. But the donee's basis in
property that has depreciated in the donor's hands is the fair market value
of the property at the time of gift.52 Thus no one gets the tax benefit of
deducting the loss that resulted from the depreciation in value. Therefore,
the basis rules mean that only taxpayers who have property with
unrealized appreciation can reduce taxes by giving that property to family
members.
B. Wealth and the Social Science Literature
Until the 1970s, studies of race and economics focused on income
rather than wealth. Studies of wealth differences by race were few and
far between. Once the importance of wealth and race was acknowledged,
the reason for the dearth of studies changed from lack of interest to
problems with data collection.53 Income surveys are relatively easy
because researchers can obtain income information from pay stubs, tax
returns and bank records.'
Because value is constantly affected by
ever-changing market conditions, information on home and car equity or
the value of household goods is harder to obtain. Even today, social
scientists point out that wealth data is suspect if for no other reason than
that the wealthy are uncooperative subjects with a tendency to
substantially underestimate their holdings.55
1.

EARLY WEALTH RESEARCH

Despite data collection problems, social scientists conducted several
race and wealth studies from the 1960s through the 1980s. For these
52.
I.R.C. § 1015(a).
53.
Henry S. Terrell, Wealth Accumulation of Black and White Families: The
EmpiricalEvidence, 26 J. FIN. 363, 363 (1971) (finding that race studies focus on income
and earnings rather than wealth because of the greater availability of income data).
54.
WILLIAM P. O'HARE, WEALTH AND ECONOMIC STATUS: A PERSPECTIVE ON
RACIAL INEQUALITY 2 (1983).

55.

OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 57 (stating that "[s]urveys of assets and

wealth invariably underrepresent the upper levels, primarily because of the difficulty in
obtaining the cooperation of enough very wealthy subjects."); O'HARE, supranote 54, at
8 (finding that "income from investments tends to be underreported more than income
from other sources").
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purposes, probably the most important databases created during this
period were the United States Bureau of the Census' 1979 Income Survey
Development Program (IDSDP) and the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), which the Bureau has conducted annually since
1984. The early studies were often limited to gross comparisons, lacking
controls. For example, as late as 1983, William O'Hare complained that
he could not use IDSDP data to look at "the wealth of blacks and whites
with similar socioeconomic characteristics."'
Instead, applying gross
averages to JDSDP, O'Hare showed that, in 1979, the average black
household had one-third of the wealth of its average white counterpart.
He further showed that although blacks made up twelve percent of the
nation's households, they held only four percent of all personal wealth."
Contrasting this information with black mean income figures from the
U.S. Bureau of the Census, O'Hare pointed out that while average white
income was 1.6 times greater than black income, white wealth was three
times larger than black wealth. 59
Despite limitations on the data, some authors did try to make more
precise comparisons between more similarly situated blacks and whites.
As early as 1971, Henry Terrell took a step beyond comparing averages
when he looked at the relative size of wealth accumulation by comparing
blacks and whites in similar income ranges. Using mean income within
seven groups, Terrell showed that black wealth ranged from a low of
16.1% of white wealth in the $2500 to $4999 category, to a high of
47.3% of white wealth in the $15,000 to $19,999 income group.'
Social scientists also became interested in the different types of assets
owned by individuals of different races. For social scientists, asset
composition is important because some assets are investments that tend to
increase wealth while others are largely for consumption (e.g., homes and
cars) and do not enhance future income or wealth. Using different
databases and slightly different controls, Lorman Lundsten and Harold
Black,61 O'Hare, and Terrell all looked at asset composition and came
to much the same conclusions. To quote Terrell: "Black families have a
definite tendency toward accumulation in assets yielding consumption
services (cars, trucks, and housing) while white families hold a greater
56.

O'HARE, supra note 54, at 27.

57.
Id.at 3.
58.
Id.
59.
id.at 7.
60.
Terrell, supra note 53, at 364.
61.
Lorman L. Lundsten & Harold Black, The Impact of Race and Other
Variables on the Composition and Value of Individual Portfolios, 8 REV. BLACK POL.
ECON. 360 (1978).
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share of their nonfinancial wealth in income providing assets (farms, other
real estate, and business equity)."6 2 O'Hare concluded:
Three types of assets are likely to bring income in return:
financial assets, rental property, and ownership of businesses or
farms. Black households have a much smaller proportion of
their wealth invested in such assets than do white households.
. . . Thus, the wealth of white families actually expands their
income, to a much greater extent than for black families.
Wealth that is tied up in a home, a car, or household goods..
. represents consumption rather than investment, because these
assets do not regularly generate income; over two-thirds of
black wealth is tied up in these durable goods. Thus, this
difference in the distribution of wealth is also likely to
perpetuate itself.'
These social scientists found significant differences in the types of assets
that blacks and whites owned.
The early commentators on race and asset composition did not
classify assets according to which ones yielded tax benefits. One table
published by O'Hare is suggestive, however. The following table
concerns what O'Hare called "financial assets." It shows holdings in
various asset categories by race. Significantly, the greatest differences in
holdings between blacks and whites are for stocks and mutual funds.
These are assets which allow the owner to reap the benefit of the
realization requirement, and therefore also allow the possibility of
escaping tax on gain altogether by holding the asset until death. For the
most part, the other categories shown in the table consist of assets for
which the tax system recognizes appreciation in the year it accrues (e.g.,
savings accounts)."

62.

Terrll, supra note 53, at 366.

63.

O'HARE, supra note 54, at 14.

64.

Table 1 is reproduced from O'HARE, supra note 54, at 12.
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TABLE 1
Distribution of Financial Assets, 1979

Type of Financial Asset

Percent of households
with this type of asset
Black
White

Average holdings for
households
with this type of
asset
Black
White

Total

78.0%

95.3%

$2180

$20,413

Cash, checking accounts

70.7%

91.1%

$545

$1117

Savings accounts

48.2%

77.0%

$1670

$5107

Savings bonds

10.8%

22.9%

$396

$1808

CDs, bonds, loans

1.6%

17.5%

$15,823

Stocks, mutual funds

3.4%

21.8%

$6544

2.

$38,786
$33,838

OLIVER AND SHAPIRO

The early studies of race and wealth came to remarkably similar
conclusions of dramatic differences in asset values and asset composition.
However, these early studies did not control for such supposedly race
neutral factors as region, age, income and education. Although the idea
of using controls was attractive, the data on wealth and race took some
time to catch up to the ideal. To a large extent, more recent SIPP
databases have solved this problem. Using these databases, in 1995
Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro produced their important book entitled
Black Wealth/White Wealth.' Their study uses both gross comparisons
and multiple regression analyses to study the differences in black and
white wealth and asset composition.
Oliver and Shapiro confirmed the general conclusions reached in the
1970s and 1980s, except they found that the wealth gap between blacks
and whites is even larger than previously estimated:
African Americans have not shared equally in the nation's
prosperity. They earn less than whites, and they possess far
less wealth, whatever measure one may use .... The black-to65.

OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9.
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white median income ratio has hovered in the mid-50 to mid-60
percentage range for the past twenty years or so. . . .The
median wealth data expose even deeper inequalities. Whites
possess nearly twelve times as much median net worth as
blacks, or $43,800 versus $3,700.'
The earlier studies had estimated a black/white wealth gap of smaller
magnitude.
Oliver and Shapiro also used a large number of controls in their
work, including income, age, sex, marriage, children, number of people
who work within the household, education, occupation, work history, and
region.6 7 Terrell used some of these controls in the 1970s, but not
nearly as many nor on so large a database." With these controls Oliver
and Shapiro confirmed that nonracial factors standing alone cannot explain
the black/white wealth gap. Blacks whom Oliver and Shapiro viewed as
"middle class" because of income, occupation and education had
significantly fewer assets than similarly-situated whites:
Most significant, we believe, is that blacks' claim to middleclass status is based on income and not assets.... Recalling the
overall black-to-white income ratio of 0.62, . . . the gap for
white-collar workers narrows to 0.7, and further tapers to 0.76
for college graduates. Turning to net worth . . . the least
amount of inequality occurs among middle-income earners,
where the ratio registers 0.35; but even among households with
similar income flows the difference amounts to over $28,000.
White-collar occupations disclose the most inequality: the black
middle class owns fifteen cents for every dollar owned by the
white middle class.6
Thus Oliver and Shapiro, by looking at similarly-situated blacks and
whites, showed that race neutral factors did not fully account for
differences in wealth.
Oliver and Shapiro also studied asset composition.
They
differentiated between "net worth" and "net financial assets." They
defined "net worth" as all assets less debt and "net financial assets" as net
worth less equity in homes or cars.' Net financial assets are most likely
66.

67.
68.
employment
69.
70.

OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 85-86.

Id.at 73-85.
Terrell's regression contained controls for income, age, education,
status and residential location. Terrell, supra note 53, at 372-73.
OLIVER & SHAPIRo, supra note 9, at 95.
Id.at 58.
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to produce additional income and wealth. Net worth, with its inclusion
of assets that are permanently dedicated to consumption (i.e., houses and
cars), is more likely to produce no change in wealth or even a net
decline. Oliver and Shapiro found that "the average white household
controls $6,999 in net financial assets while the average black household
retains no [net financial asset] nest egg whatsoever," 71 and that "The net
worth middle class blacks command . . . largely represents housing
equity, because neither the middle-income earners nor the well educated
nor white-collar workers [who are black] control anything other than petty
net financial assets."' A regression equation that controlled for region
of residence, educational background, age, income, occupational prestige,
as well as a number of other race neutral factors, found race was a highly
significant predictor of the amount of net financial assets.'
C. Results of Our Study
Our review of the social science literature confirms a wide gap in
black and white wealth, both in gross averages and after controlling for
such factors as income, education, region, marriage, and children. The
studies also confirm that blacks hold a higher percentage of their wealth
in consumption items than whites do, and a lesser percentage in financial
and investment assets.
We have conducted our own analysis of available databases for two
reasons. First, because we are concerned about tax consequences, we are
interested in different categorizations of assets than the social scientists
are. Social scientists group houses and cars together as consumption
items.7' Yet we know that the Internal Revenue Code strongly favors
investment in housing, so much so that we will discuss it separately in our
next section. Similarly, the social scientists' concept of investment or
financial assets fails to distinguish between assets which can benefit from
the realization requirement and capital gains rates, such as stocks and
bonds, and assets which do not so benefit, such as bank deposits. Our
own data analysis takes account of these tax concerns in estimating
differences by race in the composition of asset holdings.
Our other addition to the social science literature is to estimate the
difference by race in the amounts received by inheritance or gift.
Amounts received by gift and inheritance are tax free to the recipient.
Equally important, amounts received by inheritance that have previously
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 130.
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 106.
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appreciated in value are eligible for the stepped up basis at death which
enables the total avoidance of tax on a gain. Hence a study of gifts and
inheritance is important to a full understanding of the different wealthrelated tax benefits that blacks and whites enjoy.
1. ANALYSIS OF RACE AND ASSET COMPOSITION
Our analysis of asset composition, which segregates assets into "tax
favored" and "tax disfavored" groupings, relies on data that the SIPP
surveys gathered. We more fully describe these databases in the
Appendix. Race is the crucial variable in all of our regression equations.
We controlled for various other independent variables to see if race
remains a statistically significant predictor of asset holdings in various tax
favored categories. We explain our selection of the variables we used as
controls in the Appendix as well.
We first constructed a dependent variable of total net worth. Using
controls for income, education, age, region and marital status, we ran a
regression to determine whether race was a statistically significant
predictor of total net worth, as measured in this data set. We found that
it was, just as other researchers had previously found using the same and
different databases. Table A in the Appendix contains the detailed results
of our regression.
In order to separate tax favored assets from disfavored assets we used
the SIPP databases to get measures of wealth in equity in one's home,
equity in real estate aside from one's own home, stocks and mutual fund
shares, and equity in vehicles. The first three of these categories are tax
favored investments. But because vehicles generally decline in value, and
the loss is not deductible if the vehicle is held for personal use, vehicles
are tax disfavored.'5 Because we have run regressions on each of these
new dependent variables, for logistical reasons (division by zero) we had
to perform the analysis using only respondents whose wealth was greater
than zero. However, that subset of respondents causes us to overlook the
fact that more blacks than whites have no wealth at all. As a result, the
wealth differences between the two racial groups that we report are most
likely smaller than they are in the general population.
Table 2 shows the mean amounts owned in each asset category, by
black and white respondents separately. The last two columns report the
percentage of total holdings in these four asset categories that consist of
assets in each individual category, again for black and white respondents
separately.

75.

I.R.C. § 262(a) (1994).
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TABLE 2
Race and Wealth Composition
Component of
Wealth

Black
Mean

White
Mean

Black
% of

White
% of

$

$

total

total

Stock/Mutual
FuAds

207

6746

0.01

0.04

Real Estate
Equity_

4587

11943

0.05

0.08

Home Equity

21384

39711

0.53

0.56

Equity in

3328

5906

0.41

0.32

29507

64306

1

1

_

Vehicles

Total

n 32,162
Data Source: 1984 Survey of Income and Pro8ram Partidpadon; Wave 4.

This table indicates that blacks who own assets are less likely to hold
assets that are tax favored. Investments in home equity need special
consideration because of the many tax incentives for homeownership, so
we discuss that data in more depth in the next section. Table 2 shows
that blacks hold a much smaller percentage of their wealth in stock and
mutual funds and real estate equity. These are both asset categories
where tax favored appreciation in value is common. In contrast, blacks
hold a greater percentage than whites of their wealth in equity in vehicles.
Assuming that almost all these vehicles are held for personal use, this is
a tax disfavored investment.
We used regression analysis to ensure that the differences displayed
in Table 2 are not byproducts of socio-economic and demographic
differences between blacks and whites.76 Tables B, C, and D in the
Appendix report the results of the regressions for each of the asset
categories except home equity, which is discussed in the next section.
The tables show that the differences by race in percentage of assets held
in the different categories in Table 2 are statistically significant after
controlling for various measures of socio-economic status, as well as age
and region of residence. Whites thus hold more tax-favored assets than
76.
The controls used in the regression equations are explained in the section of
the Appendix discussing controls infra pp. 818-20.
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blacks, even after controlling for
demographic factors.

relevant

socio-economic

771
and

2. GIFTS AND INHERITANCE

Analysts have sometimes speculated that blacks receive less in gifts
and by inheritance than whites, and that this disparity accounts for at least
part of the well-documented race and wealth disparity. 77 But little data
analysis actually addresses this question. Because of the important tax
benefits associated with gifts and inheritance,7 we decided to look at this
issue in depth. The SIPP database did not have enough information on
what people receive and what people give, but we were able to get
relevant data from the National Survey of Families and Households
(NSFH), a database compiled in 1988-89 and more fully described in the
Appendix.
Unfortunately, although the NSFH supplies data by race on the values
of gifts and inheritances, it does not break down the values according to
the type of asset that was received or inherited. This information is
important because some of the tax benefits associated with gifts and
inheritances depend on the donor or decedent transferring property with
untaxed appreciation that has resulted from the realization requirement.
For example, cash gifts and bequests get none of the benefits of avoiding
tax on previously unrealized appreciation, whereas gifts and bequests of
appreciated stock commonly capture this tax benefit.
To partially rectify this data deficiency, we constructed a variable
from the NSFH database that measured the value of assets held by blacks
and whites at age sixty-five in four asset categories: home, other real
estate, business or farm property, and motor vehicles. Our intent was to
get some measure of the value of assets that blacks and whites owned at
a time near death, as a way of estimating the differential potential by race
of taking advantage of the stepped up basis for property transferred by
bequest. However, our constructed variable is far from perfect because
it does not include the value of stocks and bonds, which are most likely
to benefit from basis adjustments at the time of gift or death.
Furthermore, our variable includes motor vehicles, which rarely benefit
from such adjustments.7'

77.
See, e.g., OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 155-56; Francine D. Blau &
John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition, 105 Q.J.
EcoN. 321, 334 (1990).
78.
See supra pp. 759-63.
79.
The recipient's basis in depreciated property under I.R.C. § 1014 and § 1015
is the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift or at the time of the
decedent's death.
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Table 3 reports the differences by race for the value of gifts given
and received, inheritances received, and value of assets held at age sixtyfive. The data comes from NSFH.
TABLE 3
Gifts and Inheritance by Race

Black (mean
per person)

White (mean per
person)

Gifts Given

$236

$1054

Gifts Received

$172

$1033

Inheritances Received

$1485

$5348

Value of Property at Age
65

$15,346

$81,936

The differences by race reported in Table 3 are very dramatic and
indicate a wide variance in the degree to which blacks and whites enjoy
the tax benefits associated with gifts and inheritance. In order to
determine whether these differences were simply a product of status
differences between blacks and whites, we ran regression equations with
respect to the value of gifts received, inheritances received, and property
held at age sixty-five. We controlled in each instance for income,
education, age, region and marital status. Race remained a statistically
significant predictor with respect to these dependent variables. We
reproduce the relevant data in Tables E, F, and G of the Appendix.
D. Conclusion
It must be emphasized that we have not measured directly the
differential impact on blacks and whites of the tax rules we have
discussed, because we have been unable to directly examine returns. The
evidence that we have gathered cannot account for the fact that not all
taxpayers who are eligible for a tax benefit claim it. Nonetheless, we
have gathered very strong inferential evidence to support the hypothesis
that whites benefit more than blacks from the tax provisions we have
studied, each of which deviates from an ideal income tax as set forth in
Glenshaw Glass. After we consider the available evidence bearing on a
similar hypothesis with respect to the tax incentives for homeownership,
we will offer some suggestions about tax policy.
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III. HOMES
A. Tax Benefits
As we saw in Part II, property that appreciates in value brings with
it many tax benefits. If an owner-occupied home has appreciated in
value, it can reap wealth-related tax benefits just like any other wealth.'
In addition to the general benefits that flow to appreciated property,
owner-occupied homes come with four tax benefits of their own. Here
we discuss Section 1034, which pushes realization past the date of sale;
Section 121, which results in $125,000 of gain escaping tax completely;
and two provisions that allow yearly deductions for the costs of owning
a home-the Section 163 deduction for mortgage interest and the Section
164 deduction for real property taxes. We begin by briefly reviewing
these provisions.
1.

GAIN ON THE SALE OF A PRINCIPAL RESIDENCE

Under Section 1034 a taxpayer can sell his principal residence at a
profit and avoid any tax on the sale if he purchases a more expensive
principal residence within two years."' Under Section 121 a person aged
fifty-five or over can also sell his principal residence and keep up to
$125,000 of gain tax free, regardless of whether he purchases a new
residence.' Sections 1034 and 121 work in conjunction so that a person
aged fifty-five or over can sell his home, purchase a new (more
expensive) home, keep $125,000 of gain tax free and defer tax on any
additional gain as well.
Both sections are a great help to homeowners of all ages and are
particularly useful for those who intend to use their homes as a tax-free
retirement account. Unlike Individual Retirement Accounts or pensions,
for which earnings are taxed on distribution,' Section 121 ensures that
$125,000 of a home's appreciation is never taxed, even when that gain is
not used for housing.
However, for the purposes of our study, there is a catch to the
benefits conferred by Sections 1034 and 121. First, in order to get any
benefits from these sections, the taxpayer must own a home, something
we will see that blacks do much less often than whites. Second, the
extent of the benefits increase as the amount of appreciation in home
80.
81.
82.
83.
784-86.

The tax advantages of appreciated property are discussed supra pp. 759-63.
I.R.C. § 1034(a).
I.R.C. § 121(a)-(b).
See the discussion of pensions in the Employee Benefits section infra pp.
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value increases. As we will see, when blacks do own homes, their
dwellings are likely to appreciate in value less than white homes do.

2.

HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST AND PROPERTY TAX DEDUCTIONS

In 1986," Congress eliminated the deduction for most personal
interest expenditures.' However, homeowners may deduct interest on
mortgages running as high as $1,000,000.1 In addition, homeowners
may still deduct an additional $100,000 of interest on loans secured by
homes even if the principal loan amount is not used for a home
purchase.
Congress also eliminated the deduction for state and local sales taxes
that are paid for personal, as opposed to business, items. 8 However,
the deduction for state and local property taxes survived."
It is commonly assumed that the mortgage interest and property tax
deductions benefit homeowners as compared with taxpayers who decide
to defer home purchases in order to spend their resources on other types
of consumption.
But we cannot know for sure whether such
discrimination occurs, because it is impossible to know whether the tax
benefits of homeownership have caused the market price of owneroccupied homes to have increased relative to the price of other forms of
consumption. If so, in effect the taxpayer fully pays for the tax benefits
of homeownership "up front." Relative to prices in a world that did not
include these tax benefits, renters may pay less for their accommodation
and homeowners may pay more for their homes.'
We can be certain, however, that the tax benefits of homeowning
are greater for homeowners with high incomes than for homeowners with
lower incomes, because the tax benefits of deductions are always a
function of income bracket. A taxpayer in the 39.6% bracket benefits
more from a deduction of $100 than a taxpayer in the 15% bracket. 91
84.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085,
2246-49 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994)).
85.
I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (1994). An interest expenditure is personal rather than
business when the loan proceeds are used for personal consumption, such as acquisition
of a personal car.
86.
I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (h)(2)(D), (h)(3)(A)-(B).
87.
I.R.C. § 163 (h)(1), (h)(2)(D), (h)(3)(C).
88.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134, 100 Stat. 2085, 2116
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 164 (1994)).
89.
I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
90.
See discussion supra p. 754.
91.
The value in tax savings of a deduction is equal to the amount of the
deduction multiplied by the tax rate. Hence, a $100 deduction is worth $39.60 to an
individual in the 39.6% tax bracket, but only worth $15 to an individual in the 15% tax
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If homeowning blacks, on average, have a lower income than
homeowning whites,' this principle alone assures that the tax benefits
of deducting mortgage interest and property taxes are racially skewed.
Of particular interest to our study is the likelihood that the tax benefits of
these deductions are also a function of home value. If we assume that on
average higher value homes carry larger mortgages which require larger
interest payments, then owners of high value homes get bigger interest
deductions and save more taxes. Similarly, although property tax rates
vary by community, owners of higher value homes likely pay more in
property taxes and thus benefit more from the property tax deduction. In
our subsequent analysis, by seeking evidence of whether blacks are likely
to own lower-valued homes, we focus particularly on this aspect of the
interest and property tax deductions.
B. Homes and the Social Science Literature
In our study we place wealth ahead of homeownership. We do this
even though housing is a form of wealth, often a family's primary form
of wealth. Nevertheless, we believe that the Internal Revenue Code's
many structural and statutory benefits for wealth cast a greater shadow on
the entire Code than benefits for homeownership alone. There are
relatively few social science studies of black/white differences in wealth,
however.
In contrast, there are many social science studies of
black/white differences in homeownership. We divide our discussion of
these studies into two categories, those bearing on differences in
ownership rates, and those bearing on differences in the value of homes.
There is a uniform consensus that blacks are less likely than whites
to own a home. Writing in 1980, Mary Jackman and Robert Jackman
reported that "Whites are considerably more likely to be owners than
blacks; 71.3 percent of the whites and 41.2 percent of the blacks indicated
that they own their home."" Other studies show ownership disparity
rates of a similar range.' As one would expect, and as illustrated in
Table 3 below, all studies show that elderly blacks are more likely to own
homes than young and middle-aged blacks, a fact that will affect our
bracket.
92.
This seems very likely. O'HARE, supra note 54, at 3, reports that the
annual income of black families is about sixty percent that of white families.
93.
Mary R. Jackman & Robert W. Jackman, Racial Inequalities in Home
Ownership, 58 Soc. FORCES 1221, 1222-23 (1980).
94.
See, e.g., Hayward D. Horton, Race and Wealth: A DemographicAnalysis
of Black Homeownership, 62 Soc. INQUIRY 480, 483 (1992); Paul M. Ong & J. Eugene
Grigsby III, Race and Life-Cycle Effects on Home Ownership in Los Angeles 1970 to
1980, 23 URn. AFF. Q. 601, 608-10 (1988).
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"black analysis" of Section 121's exclusion of gains on the sale of a home
by people aged fifty-five or over." For the most part, published studies
also find a black/white differential ownership of homes after controlling
for appropriate indicants of socio-economic status. The following table,
reproduced from Oliver & Shapiro, is exemplary of the findings of
several different researchers.9
TABLE 4: Home Ownership by Race and Income

Household Income

Whites

Blacks

Tola

0.638

0.416

<$11,611

0.473

0.274

$11,611-24,999

0.549

0.408

$25,000-34,999

0.615

0.454

$35,000-49,999

0.765

0.668

> $50,000

0.854

0.75

Data Source: 1987 Survey of Income and Program Participation Survey-Wave 4

This table, then, illustrates that whites are more likely than blacks to own
homes.
Some commentators have disagreed with the implications of this
table, arguing that if different controls are used, it can be shown that
blacks are more likely than similarly-situated whites to own homes.
Howard Birnbaum and Rafael Weston have argued that if an appropriate
measure of wealth is used as a control, blacks are even more likely to
own their homes than whites.' James Long and Steven Caudill found
that permanent income and central city location, rather than race, explain
See the Black Congress section infra pp. 790-91.
95.
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 109.
96.
97.
Howard Birnbaum & Rafael Weston, Home Ownersho and the Wealth
Position of Black and White Americans, 20 REv. INCOME & WEALTH 103, 110, 113
(1974).
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the differences in black/white homeownership rates."
However, a
minority of analysts reach such conclusions.
In regard to studies of home values, Long and Caudill's 1992 study
shows that black couples own a disproportionately lower share of
aggregate housing wealth, both because they are less likely to be
homeowners and because they are more likely to own homes with low
market values." When they used controls, Long and Caudill found that
race explained differences in the value of homes, as opposed to the rate
of homeownership."
Toby Parcel focused his study on equity in owner occupied
housing."1 Parcel limited his study to male homeowners in the labor
force and imposed controls for earnings, age, marital status, and area of
current residence."° Using these limitations on the data and additional
controls to ferret out other factors that increase or decrease homeowner
equity, Parcel found that for every $1000 increase in earnings, whites
increase their home equity by $514 on average while black home equity
does not increase at allYD
There are fewer studies that have looked at appreciation in housing
value, a critical question for tax analysis. Oliver and Shapiro have done
the most extensive study, and the following quotation summarizes their
findings:
Among blacks and whites who bought less expensive
homes [between 1978 and 1988], the typical white
homeowner's equity increased by $40,700 with an average
black increase of $27,500.
Among those buying less
expensive homes, white home values grew 122 percent in.
comparison to 79 percent for blacks. Among those buying
98.
Long and Caudill state that:
Of all the potential differences between black and white households controlled
for in the model, permanent-income and central-city-residence differentials are
most important by far, each responsible for over 30 percent of the observed
black-white homeownership gap. The remaining racial disparities are
statistically significant but relatively unimportant as far as contributing to the
homeownership gap between black and white couples.
James E. Long & Steven B. Caudill, Racial Differences in Home Ownershipand Housing
Wealth, 1970-1986, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 83, 88 (1992).
99.
Id. at 99.
100.
Id. at 95-97.
101.
Equity is defined as fair market value less mortgage. Toby L. Parcel,
Wealth Accumulation of Black and White Men: The Case of Housing Equity, 30 Soc.
PROBs. 199, 202 (1982).
102.
Id. at 202-03.
103.
Id. at 205.
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more expensive homes, the typical white home appreciated
$47,800, or 56 percent, while the value of an average black
one went up $34,900 or 44 percent. . . . mhose who
bought homes between 1967 and 1977... have enjoyed a
longer period of equity accumulation, one including the
recent era of high inflation. Whites who bought less
expensive homes... benefited from a $60,000 gain in home
equity versus $28,700 for blacks in the same purchase
bracket ....

Among those buying more expensive homes,

the characteristic white home went up almost $78,000 in
value and the typical black home value increased by
$38,700; blacks experienced an impressive 88 percent
growth in equity, but whites' home equity rose 148 percent.
A regression analysis confirms the importance of race
in housing appreciation, even when non-race-related factors
affecting home values are taken into account."0 '
Although Oliver and Shapiro find that the value of black housing and
housing appreciation is lower, they make one additional finding of
potentially great importance. They find that housing constitutes a
significantly greater percentage of black wealth (62.5%) than of white
wealth (43.3%).'1 Even though blacks own less housing value than
similarly-situated whites, they own even less of other kinds of assets,
except, as noted in our wealth discussion, equity in vehicles. This finding
is consistent with the findings of other commentators, as discussed in Part
II.
C. Results of Our Study
Because there have been so many studies of race and home
ownership, less need exists for us to do our own data analysis. The
studies have conflicted, however, on whether blacks own fewer homes
than whites when controls for socio-economic status and other appropriate
factors are considered. For this reason, we did a limited study using data
from the 1988 National Survey of Families and Households, which
contains a randomly-drawn sample of over 9000 families and households.
In this database, 38.8% of the blacks owned their homes, while
61.6% of the non-hispanic whites did so. A regression analysis
controlling for family income, age, urban residence, education, and
marital status showed that race was a statistically significant predictor of
104.

105.

OLIvER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 148, 150.

Id. at 106.
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homeownership in this sample. Table H of the Appendix reports this
data.
Using the SIPP data that we reported in Part H, we analyzed the
value of home equity for blacks and whites. As reported in Table I of the
Appendix, we find that blacks have less home equity than whites after
controlling for socio-economic and demographic factors. This confirms
prior research. In contrast to some other studies, however, we find that
blacks and whites tend to devote approximately the same proportion of
their total wealth to home equity, once we control for socio-economic
status and demographics. Other studies have shown blacks with a higher
proportion of their total wealth in housing than whites even after using
similar controls. 1"
D. A Black Congress on Wealth and Homeownership
In our introduction, we asked how a Black Congress would write tax
rules on income averaging. Now we ask that question about wealth and
homeownership.
The data on blacks and wealth tells us that blacks own very little
wealth and that this lack of wealth is at least partially responsible for the
continuing black/white wealth gap. Blacks inherit very little wealth and
they do not acquire very much more during their lifetimes. As a
consequence, blacks receive very little benefit from the Code sections
discussed in Part II. In particular, blacks are much less likely than whites
to own assets, such as stocks and bonds, that benefit from the realization
requirement, a necessary prerequisite to benefiting from the stepped up
basis at death and a usual prerequisite to benefiting from the favorable
capital gains tax rates.
A partial exception to this generalization concerns homes. The tax
benefits that apply to stocks and bonds also apply to homes. Appreciation
in home value is not taxed until realized, and can avoid tax altogether if
the owner transfers it at death. Homeowners benefit additionally from
some special tax provisions, such as forgiveness of tax on $125,000 in
gain for realizations during the owner's lifetime. Although whites own
more homes and more valuable homes than blacks, even after controlling
for appropriate nonrace variables, many blacks do own homes that
appreciate in value. The social science studies indicate that blacks have
at least as high a percentage of their wealth invested in homes as whites
106.
O'HARE, supra note 54, at 9 (finding that "equity in a home accounted for
almost half of the wealth of blacks (46 percent) but less than a third of the wealth of
whites (32 percent)"); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 106 (finding that home equity
accounted for 62.5% of the wealth of blacks and 43.3% of the wealth of whites);
Birnbaum & Weston, supra note 97, at 107.

HeinOnline -- 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 779 1996

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
do, and perhaps a greater percentage. Unlike the tax benefits that apply
primarily to other forms of wealth, from which few blacks gain, many
blacks benefit from the tax benefits of homeownership.
But while blacks benefit, whites benefit even more. White homes
appreciate more, and hence receive more favorable treatment of gains
from investments in homes. Moreover, because white homes are more
valuable, on average whites benefit more than blacks from the deductions
for home mortgage interest and property taxes.
Vehicle equity is one form of investment for which no tax benefits
exist. In fact, the Code disfavors investment in vehicle equity, because
unlike losses in investments in most other kinds of assets except homes,
owners cannot deduct declines in vehicle value. Since the Code views
such declines in value as consumption expenses, this tax result is
commonly considered consistent with the Glenshaw Glass vision of
income. It is still worth noting, however, that although whites on average
own more total vehicle equity, even after controlling for income and other
measures of status, blacks indisputably invest a higher percentage of their
wealth in vehicles than whites do."°7 Hence the one category of assets
which blacks favor in their investment behavior, in comparison with white
investment behavior, receives no tax benefits.
As we turn to suggestions about how a Black Congress might amend
the Code in light of our findings, two preliminary comments are
appropriate. First, if a Black Congress truly existed, we would not
expect it to act solely in the interest of blacks, any more than we expect
the current Congress, which is mostly white, to act solely in the interest
of whites. Our Black Congress, oriented solely to the interest of blacks,
is purely a metaphor, useful for analytic purposes.
Second, our Black Congress is not solely motivated by the goal of
minimizing black taxes. Blacks are interested in government spending;
consequently, some of our recommendations will reflect concerns about
the level of government revenues. Moreover, the tax provisions we are
considering all have ostensible purposes which may benefit blacks. For
example, the realization requirement and the stepped up basis at death are
commonly justified as making the tax system more administrable. The
realization requirement permits a sale or exchange to measure the amount
of asset appreciation, rather than relying on some alternative valuation
method.
The stepped up basis at death avoids the necessity for
determining a decedent's basis in property, which can be very difficult
when the person has kept inadequate records. Not all of the supposed
benefits are administrative. The special tax benefits for homeowning, for

107.
p. 808.

See Table 2 and discussion supra p. 770, and Table D in the Appendix infra
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instance, are justified as explicit incentives for taxpayers to own rather
than rent their residences, apparently on the theory that homeowners on
average are more stable and responsible citizens." We do not agree
with all of these justifications, but it is not the point of this article to
debate about them. However, a Black Congress would consider these
usual justifications for tax benefits.
We next offer some suggested tax reforms that a Black Congress
might consider in light of our findings.
1.

Replace the currenthome mortgage interestdeduction
and the deductionfor realproperty taxes with a credit
(ofan undeterminedpercentage) that begins to decline
to zero once adjusted gross income on a joint return
exceeds $50,000.

Currently, taxpayers are allowed a deduction for home mortgage
interest and real property taxes. The benefit of deductions is a function
of bracket, benefiting wealthier taxpayers more than less wealthy ones.
Credits, which a taxpayer subtracts directly from the taxes he owes, save
a taxpayer the amount of the credit, regardless of his bracket. Because
whites have higher-valued homes on average and hence probably pay
more interest and taxes, they would receive a greater proportion of total
tax benefits from credits than their proportion in the population or even
in the homeowning population. But at least a switch from deductions to
credits would distribute more of the tax benefits of homeownership to
blacks than is currently the case, while still preserving tax incentives for
homeownership.
Currently, a taxpayer cannot deduct the home mortgage interest that
is generated by mortgage principal in excess of $1,000,000.
Furthermore, both the interest deduction and the real property tax
deduction are reduced when adjusted gross income on a joint return
exceeds $114,700."° In order to maintain this principle of phasing out
the tax benefit for the most wealthy, our proposed credit begins to decline
to zero once taxpayers reach an adjusted gross income of $50,000 a year.
Because most black families earn less than $50,000,"l° they will not be
adversely affected by this limitation.

108.
S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 804 (1986) (stating that "encouraging
home ownership is an important policy goal").
109.
I.R.C. § 68(a), (b)(1) (1994) (adjusting the $100,000 applicable amount for
inflation).
110.
Only six percent of black families have incomes greater than $50,000.
OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 102.
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2.

Maintain the Section 121 exclusion for $125,000 of
gain on the sale of a personal residence, and maintain
the Section 1034 rollover of gain on the sale of a
principalresidence.

Because homeownership is one of the most common forms of black
investment, we suggest maintaining the $125,000 exclusion for gain on
the sale of a personal residence for homeowners aged fifty-five and over,
and the postponement of realization permitted by the rollover of gain.
Because black homes are generally lower-valued, there is no need to
increase the $125,000 limit. Tax benefits for this type of gain may help
blacks accumulate wealth that they can bequeath, so that blacks can begin
inheriting wealth.
3.

Tax propertyappreciationas it accrues on investments
in publicly traded securities and nonresidential real
estate.

Except for homes and vehicles, blacks generally do not own
property. Instead, blacks earn income in the form of wages that are
immediately subject to tax. Depository accounts are probably the most
common form of black wealth other than homes and vehicles. Hence
repeal of the realization requirement would raise considerable revenue
without adversely affecting blacks. We believe that limiting repeal of the
realization requirement to publicly traded securities and nonresidential real
estate is an eminently practical reform, because it is possible to measure
the extent of appreciation on these assets without a sale or exchange.
Public listings report the trading value of securities, and property tax
assessments provide a usually reliable estimate of the market value of real
estate.
4.

Repeal special tax ratesfor capital gains.

It is very unlikely that many blacks benefit directly from special rates
for capital gains. Homes are eligible for these favorable rates, but with
the stepped up basis at death, the exclusion of $125,000 of gain for homes
sold by an owner aged fifty-five or over, and the Section 1034 rollover
of gain, most gain on homes is probably not ever subject to tax. While
some argue that favorable rates for capital gains stimulate economic
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activity which trickles down to taxpayers who never enjoy a capital
gain,"' we have little faith in trickle down economics.
5.

Maintain the Section 102 exclusion for income from
gifts and inheritances.

Although blacks receive few gifts or bequests that benefit from this
exclusion, we decline to recommend changing it for two reasons. First,
any change in this provision must be coordinated with gift and estate taxes
because it may not be appropriate to tax both the grantor and the
recipient. But consideration of gift and estate taxes is beyond the scope
of this article.
Second, a Black Congress might want to preserve some incentives
for savings and intergenerational transfers of wealth. The story of black
American life has been one of inability to pass wealth from generation to
generation, whether because of slavery, racism, or poverty. The inability
to transfer wealth has adversely affected black wealth. We believe that
a Black Congress would prefer to encourage, rather than discourage, such
transfers.
IV. EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

A. Tax Benefits
Under the ideal comprehensive income tax system based on the
Glenshaw Glass definition of income as "accessions to wealth," whether
a taxpayer received a payment for wages in cash or in kind would not

matter. A person who received $10,000 in cash would be taxed the same
amount as someone who received an employer purchased life insurance
policy worth $10,000. Nonetheless many employee benefits are never
taxed to the employee even though they have value and the employer
treats the benefit as a deductible expense. Examples include parking
valued at under $155 a month;"' health insurance;113 life
insurance;.1 4 educational assistance;"
discounts on clothing,
111.
For a discussion of this issue, see Robert Dodge, Economists Have Questions
About Dole Tax Cut, DALLAS MoRN1NO NEWS, Aug. 11, 1996, at 1H.
112.
I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(3) (1994). This benefit is capped at $155 per month.
113.
I.R.C. § 106.
114.
I.R.C. § 79(a). To the extent that the cost of the life insurance exceeds
$50,000, it is included in the gross income of the employee. I.R.C. § 79(a)(1).
115.
The amount of any reduction in tuition provided to an employee of an
educational organization for education (below the graduate level) at such organization is
not included in the gross income of the employee. I.R.C. § 117(d). Employees of other
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appliances and other retail goods when the employee works for the retail
store;11 and airline tickets for airline employees. 17 Another group
of employee benefits are taxed, but the imposition of the tax is delayed.
Employee benefits that defer taxes include employer paid pensions;"8
employee contributions to pensions;" 9 employee contributions to tax
deferred annuities (sometimes called 401(k) plans or 403(b) plans);
and Keogh plans, which are self-directed pension plans for the self-

employed. 121
The employee benefits that escape tax entirely or that are taxed later
than they would be under a Glenshaw Glass definition of income provide
significant tax savings. We focus our study on the two benefits that
produce the largest tax savings: pensions (including tax deferred
annuities), and employer-paid health insurance.' " We are interested,
of course, in whether blacks receive proportionately fewer benefits than
whites.
B. Employee Benefits and the Social Science Literature
Social scientists have long been interested in studying income
differences by race, and their work has naturally involved employee
benefits, since they are an important component of income. For our
purposes, the most appropriate database is the U.S. Census Bureau's 1988
Current PopulationSurvey on employee benefits." z
Joni Hersch and Shelley White-Means have published the most
significant analysis of this data for our purposes." u A limit of this
study, however, is that respondents were asked only whether they
received a particular type of benefit, without ascertaining its value.
Hersch and White-Means compensated for this deficiency by assuming
that each benefit a respondent received had an average value for benefits
institutions can receive up to $5250 of educational assistance from their employers tax
free. 1.R.C. § 127.
I.R.C. § 132(a)(2), (c). To the extent that the employee discount exceeds the
116.
gross profit percentage of the price at which the property is being offered by the employer
to customers, it is included in gross income. I.R.C. § 132(c)(1)(A).
117.
I.R.C. § 132(a)(1), (b).
I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(1), 501(a).
118.
I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(1), 501(a).
119.
I.R.C. §§ 401(k), 403(b).
120.
121.
I.R.C. § 401(c).
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
122.
27 (10th ed. 1994).
123.
For a discussion of the database see infra Appendix, Part 11.
124.
Joni Hersch & Shelley White-Means, Employer-Sponsored Health and
Pension Benefits and the Gender/Race Wage Gap, 74 Soc. SCI. Q. 851 (1993).
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in that industry."z They limited their analysis to wage and salary
workers employed privately in nonagricultural employment and between
the ages of eighteen and sixty-five." For this sample, they studied
only health and pension benefits and not contributions to 401(k) plans.
Hersch and White-Means found that 52% of white men in private
employment in 1988 were covered by employer provided pension plans
and that 75% received employer provided health care. In contrast, only
39% of all other workers in private employment (white women, black
men, black women, etc.) were covered by employer provided pension
plans and only 58% received employer paid health insurance."z
However, the authors acknowledge that part of these differences is
accounted for by the fact that white men are more likely than other
groups to accept benefits for which they are eligible."
Moreover,
Hersch and White-Means' statistics combine race and gender. Data from
our research, which we will report below, suggests that the "benefits gap"
reported by Hersch and White-Means is more accounted for by gender
differences than race differences.
In addition, Hersch and White-Means did not directly measure the
extent to which the above percentages were related to age, education, and
other non-race and non-gender worker characteristics. However, they did
construct a total compensation variable consisting of both wages and
benefits. Hersch and White-Means used a regression equation to
determine whether race and gender differences in total compensation
could be explained by other worker characteristics. Their conclusions
were as follows:
The wage and total compensation equations indicate that
almost half of the log earnings gap between white and black
men is explained by differences in qualifications. The
remaining 54 percent may be interpreted as attributable to
discrimination. However, for women, particularly black
women, the log wage and log compensation gaps are largely
unexplained by differences in qualifications, suggesting that
discrimination may be an important component of the
gender-race wage gap. Over 65 percent of the log earnings
gap between white women and white men and about 80
percent of the log earnings gap between black women and
125.
Hersch & White-Means relied on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1988
survey of employee benefits for the average value of benefits in a particular industry. Id.
at 853.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 851.
128.
Id. at 855.
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white men is unexplained by observable characteristics and
may be attributable, at least in part, to discrimination.'"

Finally, Hersch and White-Means measured how adding benefits to
wages increased or reduced the wage gap between white men and the
other groups. Their conclusions were mixed. Counting benefits
decreased the earnings gap when black men or women were compared
with white men, but it increased the gap when white women were
compared with white men. In no case, however, did adding benefits to
wages make a great difference in the "gaps" between the groups they
studied." 3 Because fringe benefits contribute so little to the narrowing
of any wage gap, Hersch and White-Means concluded that:
While fringe benefits in the form of health care are heralded as
equalizers in the employment setting, they have only a small
impact on gender and race differences in earnings gaps and/or
the returns to qualifications.
Women, particularly black
women, still face a large compensation disadvantage relative to
white men.'
C. Results of Our Study
For several reasons, we did our own analysis of the same data used
by Hersch and White-Means. We were interested in results for the entire
labor force, not just the private sector, nonagricultural employees Hersch
and White-Means studied. Since public sector employees are generally
assumed to receive extensive benefits, and public sector employment is
generally assumed to be less subject to racial discrimination than private
129.
Hersch & White Means, supra note 124, at 861-63.
130.
The following table is reproduced from id. at 856:
TABLE 3
Earnings Ratios (%)
Earnings Measure
All Workers
Hourly wage
Hourly wage + benefits
Benefit-Sector workers
Hourly wage
Hourly wage + benefits

WF/WM

71.3
70.3

72.4
71.9

BMIWM

82.8
82.6

81.5
82.1

arnngs ratios are based on geometric means.
131.
Id. at 864-65.
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employment, public sector employees were an ideal group to test our
hypotheses. We also wanted to look at the data on participation in 401(k)
and Keogh plans, in addition to receipt of health and pension benefits
included in Hersch and White-Means' study. Finally, since the census
data measured only receipt of employee benefits, not their value, we did
not want to try to estimate their value as Hersch and White-Means did.
Instead, we simply studied whether there are racially-explained differences
in the receipt of any of the four types of employee benefits that we
analyzed.
Unfortunately, the census data did not include enough respondents
participating in Keogh plans to permit us to draw any statistically
significant results. Table 5 reports the extent of participation in other
benefits for blacks and whites respectively.
TABLE 5
Participation in Employer-Provided Benefits by Race

Benefits

Blacks

Whites

Health Insurance

0.83

0.82

401(k)*

0.12

0.17

Pension

0.77

0.79

Data Source: May 1988 Current Population Survey-Employee Benefits
* Difference is significant with 99 % confidence

We used regression equations to determine whether there were
racially significant differences in the receipt of these benefits after
controlling for essentially the same worker characteristics that Hersch and
White-Means did. 32 We found that at the 95% confidence level race
was a significant predictor of receipt of pension benefits and that at the
99% confidence level race was a predictor of participation in a 401(k)
plan. However, race was not a statistically significant predictor of receipt
of health benefits. The relevant tables showing the results of these
regressions are reproduced in the Appendix as Tables J, K, and L.

132.
Hersch and White-Means look at employment in the "benefit sector" as a
function of age, marital status, number of children, education, hours worked, union status,
metropolitan location, location in the South, family income, industry, occupation, and firm
size. Id. at 858.
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D. Conclusion
Because blacks are less likely to be employed and, when employed,
to enjoy benefits, blacks are less likely to receive tax favored employee
benefits of all kinds. We found evidence that, when controlling for
relevant socio-economic and demographic factors, blacks are less likely
than whites to participate in employer-provided pension and 401(k) plans.
However, when controlling for relevant socio-economic and demographic
factors, there is no evidence that blacks are less likely to receive employer
provided health insurance.
Our findings pertain just to participation in benefit programs. The
value of benefits received, which Hersch and White-Means crudely
estimated, is more relevant to tax concerns, since as the value of excluded
or deferred benefits increase, the tax benefits grow as well. Although we
have no direct evidence on point, it seems likely that the value of
employer-provided health benefits is more or less the same for all
workers, since the Code requires that employer provided health benefits
be "non-discriminatory" if they are to be excluded from the employee's
income. 133
To be non-discriminatory, "benefits provided for
participants who are highly compensated individuals [must be] provided
for all other participants,""' and a health plan must benefit at least
seventy percent of all employees. 35
On the other hand, the analogous non-discrimination rules for
employer-provided pension plans permit employers to contribute amounts
to pensions proportionate to wages. Thus highly compensated employees
receive more tax deferred contributions than others." Because blacks
are less likely to be highly compensated, when they do participate in
employer provided pension and 401(k) plans, they are likely to receive
less pension benefits than whites.
Finally, we emphasize that the benefit of all exclusions or deferrals
of income are a function of the relevant tax bracket. Because blacks on
average are in lower marginal brackets than whites, even if they receive
employee benefits of equivalent dollar value to whites-as they may with
respect to health benefits-the tax savings to the average black is less than
the tax savings to the average white.

133.
134.
135.
136.
in favor of

I.R.C. § 105(h) (1994).
I.R.C. § 105(h)(4).
I.R.C. § 105(h)(3)(A)(i).
1.R.C. § 401(a)(5)(B); see also I.R.C. §401(b (permitting modest deviations
highly compensated employees from even a proportionate standard).
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E. A Black Congress on Employee Benefits
The first observation a Black Congress might make about tax
excluded and deferred employee benefits is that the degree of racial
skewing is not nearly as great as it is for the tax benefits discussed in Part
II. Accordingly, employee benefits are not likely to be at the top of a
Black Congress' tax reform agenda.
However, because there is evidence that the tax benefits of pension
and 401(k) plans are skewed racially, a Black Congress might nonetheless
consider employee benefit reform. Before we discuss what reforms it
might consider, however, we will discuss the very interesting situation
regarding health benefits.
We have not found evidence that, when appropriate controls are
used, blacks receive health benefits less often than whites. Of course,
because whites on average are in higher brackets, they benefit more from
the tax exclusion. Still, Hersch and White-Means found that the wages
of black men are a higher percentage of white men's earnings when
benefits are added to wages. 37 We suspect this finding results from the
non-discrimination rules respecting health benefits. If one adds a constant
to two numbers, one of which is larger than the other, the absolute
difference between the two numbers remains the same but the lower
number nonetheless becomes a higher percentage of the other. 3 '
Some commentators contend, however, that the non-discrimination
rules that tie tax benefits to a wide distribution of employee benefits
actually work against blacks and other low income workers. They claim
that these rules force employers to provide benefits that low income
workers do not want and which make low income workers too expensive
to employ. To attract high income employees, who value tax free
benefits more than low income employees because of their marginal
bracket, the employer is forced to give expensive employee benefits to the
high rate group. However, because of the Internal Revenue Code's nondiscrimination rules, the employer must include low rate employees in its
employee benefits package as well. But, the argument proceeds, to pay
for these increased benefits to low wage employees, the employer pays
lower wages to his low income employees. Increased employee benefits
in return for decreased cash wages is a bad trade for low tax rate
employees because the value ratio of employee benefits to tax benefits is
smaller for low tax rate employees. Thus the argument concludes that the
Internal Revenue Code's forced inclusion of high tax rate and low tax rate
.137.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
138.
For example, the absolute difference between 3 and 5 is 2, and 3 is 60% of
5. The absolute difference between 4 and 6 is also 2, but 4 is approximately 67% of 6.
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workers in the same employee benefits package distorts income between
the groups by giving high rate employees too few benefits and low rate
employees too many. 13
Evaluation of this nonempirical, a priori argument is beyond the
scope of this article, except for one observation. The non-discrimination
rules do not necessarily result in low tax rate employees receiving cash
wage reductions exceeding the value of the benefits they receive. High
tax rate employees may receive wage reductions exceeding the cost of
providing the health benefits to them, so that the employer is able to fund
the benefits for low rate employees required by the non-discrimination
rules. In other words, the non-discrimination rules may require high tax
rate employees to share some of their tax benefits with low tax rate
employees.
Given the ambiguity respecting whether blacks are benefited or
harmed by the exclusion of health benefits from income, we doubt that a
Black Congress would want to change this tax benefit. But this discussion
about the possible impact of the non-discrimination rules suggests an
interesting approach to reform of the tax treatment of employer provided
pension benefits. The non-discrimination rules currently applicable to
pension benefits cannot leverage high rate employees to share their
benefits with low rate employees, because they do not require a parity in
the absolute value of the pension benefits provided to high and low rate
employees. Instead, the non-discrimination rules require only that
employer contributions to pension funds be approximately proportionate
to taxable wages for high and low wage employees. To limit the racial
skewing of the tax benefits from the tax deferral of employer pension
contributions, however, the non-discrimination rules might be amended
to require that the contributions have the same absolute value. As a less
radical alternative, the amount of annual employer pension contributions
that receive tax deferred treatment might be capped. Here the goal is to
allow the tax benefits of deferral for employer contributions sufficient to
provide a middle, or even an upper middle, income lifestyle, without
providing the same tax benefit for contributions to pensions that are
principally a vehicle for investing accumulated wealth.
A Black Congress' approach to 401(k) plans might be to repeal them.
The evidence of racial skewing of the tax benefits of 401(k) plans is
strong, even after controlling for relevant worker characteristics. Blacks
may work less frequently for employers who offer 401(k) plans. Further,
since participation in 401(k) plans is voluntary for employees, blacks may
139.
For an article that makes this argument, see Frank A. Scott et al., Effects on
the Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits on Labor Market Segmentation, 42 INDUs. & LAB.
REL. REv. 216, 220 (1989).
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not choose to participate in the same proportions as whites with similar
salaries and opportunities. Because of the differential wealth of blacks
and whites with similar incomes, it may be more burdensome for blacks
to voluntarily defer receipt of income. Thus blacks benefit relatively little
from the availability of 401(k) plans, just as they benefit relatively little

from preferential rates for capital gains or the stepped up basis at
death. 140
V. MARRIAGE PENALTY

A. Tax Benefits
Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes different tax
schedules depending on whether the taxpayer(s): (1) are married and file
a joint return; (2) file as a head of household;14 (3) are not married and

file a single return; or (4) are married but file separate returns. In this
section we will focus on the first and third rate schedules, which are the

ones most frequently used.
The joint return enables many married couples to pay a lower total
tax on their combined income than they would if they were each single

and paid taxes on the income each earned or received. We will call this
a "marriage bonus." However, the joint return benefits a married couple
only when there is a gap between each partner's income. At all levels of
income, if each partner's income is the same, the couple will pay at least
as much combined tax as they would if each remained single. Moreover,
at higher income levels, the joint return status makes husbands and wives

who earn close to the same amount of income pay more tax than they
would if they remained single. When this latter situation occurs, it is
called a "marriage penalty." 42
Section 1 rate schedules are adjusted annually with respect to the

amounts of taxable income at which higher tax rates apply (e.g., 28%
140.
Although we have not studied IRAs, and could not get meaningful data about
Keogh plans, it is likely we would reach the same conclusion (i.e., repeal) about all tax
deferral schemes that are voluntary with the taxpayer.
An individual is considered a head of a household if such individual is not
141.
married and maintains as his home a household which constitutes the principal place of
abode of a dependent of the individual. I.R.C. § 2(b) (1994).
142.
Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 991-94 (1993). For a chart giving
the amount of the marriage penalty in 1993 for a wide range of combined incomes and
distributions between spouses, see John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo II, The Marriage Tax
Penalty: Inequitiesand Tax Planning Opportunities, 52 01HO CPA J., Dec. 1993, at 2122. The authors indicate that at a combined income of $100,000, the marriage penalty
exceeds $1200 if the lower earning spouse earns 40% or more of the combined income.
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rather than 15%)."4 So long as the combined taxable income of a
couple is less than the amount at which the single taxpayer's rate shifts
from 15% to 28%-$22,100 in 1995-there can be no marriage bonus or
penalty. All the taxable income will be taxed at 15%, whether it is
earned by one person or jointly and whether the taxpayers are married or
single.'"
For joint returns in 1995, the rate shifted from 15% to 28% for
taxable income over $36,900.1'
If a couple has a taxable income
between the rate shift levels for single and joint returns, there is a
possibility of a marriage bonus. If the income is earned by only one
partner, some of it which would be taxed at a higher rate on a single
return (28%), is taxed at a lower rate on a joint return (all income at
15%). Although a marriage bonus is possible even when both partners
have some taxable income, the marriage bonus is always greatest for a
given combined taxable income when all that income is attributed to one
partner. The population of one wage earner married couples are therefore
the greatest beneficiaries of the marriage bonus.
Once a couple's taxable income rises above the rate shift level for
joint returns, however, the couple faces the possibility of a marriage
penalty. If each partner earns a taxable income of $20,000 for example,
it will all be taxed at 15% if they file two single returns. But if this same
couple is married and files jointly, some of their combined income will
be taxed at 28%.11 The marriage penalty will be greatest for any given
combined taxable income when each partner has the same taxable income.
That is the situation in which the greatest proportion of the combined
income taxed at a higher joint rate (e.g. 28%) would have been taxed at
a lower single rate (e.g. 15%) if the parties had remained single. The
143.
I.R.C. § 1(0.
144.
However, there can be a marriage penalty at lower income levels due to the
standard deduction under I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) ($5000 for joint returns, $3000 for single
returns). Moreover, because the earned income credit is phased-out as income rises, and
combined income is used for a married couple filing jointly, in some circumstances one
would receive a higher earned income credit if single than if married. See Daniel R.
Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the MarriageTax, 48 NAT'L TAX
J. 91, 92-93 (1995). However, in this article we explore only marriage bonuses and
penalties resulting from the Section 1 rate schedules, because our social science data is
most relevant to this issue.
145.
See I.R.C. § l(a)(2), (0(1).
146.
Married partners derive no rate advantage from filing separate returns. The
taxable incomes at which rates shift for married filing separately returns is exactly 50%
of the income at which the rates shift for married filing jointly returns (e.g., in 1993, the
rate shifted from 15% to 28% at a taxable income of $18,450 for married filing separately
returns). I.R.C. § 1(a), (d). In the example in the text, therefore, if the couple were
married they could not avoid a 28% rate on some of the taxable income by electing to file
separate returns.
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possibility for a marriage penalty or bonus continues to exist at all higher
incomes until the lower income partner has an individual taxable income
of $250,000. Taxable incomes above that amount were taxed, in 1995,
at 39.6%, the highest possible rate, whether reported on a single or a
joint return."'
Our first hypothesis is that married blacks are more likely than

married whites to live in two wage earner couples. Since there is never
a marriage penalty without two wage earners, and one wage earner
couples gain the greatest marriage bonuses, if the hypothesis is true then
white couples enjoy more and larger marriage bonuses than black couples.
Our second hypothesis is that when both spouses work, and have
combined incomes high enough to risk substantial marriage penalties, the

gap between the husband's and wife's wages in white families is on
average higher than the average gap in wages between black spouses. If
this is true, then black couples are more likely to suffer substantial
marriage penalties than white couples."4 5

147.
See I.R.C. § 1(a), (c), (f)(1). The combined effects of the marriage bonus
and penalty can be illustrated by comparing the following three couples (A, B, and C).
CoupleA is married and files a joint return. Couples B and C are unmarried and file four
separate returns. Each couple has a combined taxable income of $40,000 in 1995.
CoupleA pays a 15% rate on $36,900 (=$5535) and a 28% rate on $3100 (=$868),
for a tax of $6403. Couple B consists of two individuals filing single returns, each with
a taxable income of $20,000. All their income is taxed at a 15% rate, for a tax of $6000.
Comparing Couple B with Couple A indicates that the latter pays a "marriage penalty" of
$403.
Couple C consists of two individuals filing single returns, but one partner has no
taxable income. The other partner has a taxable income of $40,000. $22,100 is taxed
at a 15% rate (=$3315) and $17,900 is taxed at a 28% rate (=$5012), for a tax of $8327.
Comparing Couple C with Couple A indicates that at this combined income, there is a
marriage bonus for single income couples (which could also be called a "single penalty")
of $1924.
148.
As in all parts of this paper, we are looking here only at the relation between
race and a small part of the tax code. In particular, we are not looking here at the special
head of household rate schedule, which sometimes taxes income of a qualifying single
person at lower rates than other single people. It is possible the head of household rate
schedule benefits blacks more than whites. However, we do not explore that question
here.
We also do not discuss the married filing separately rate schedule. That schedule
is rarely selected, as it rarely is to the tax advantage of a married couple to file separately.
See supra note 146. Hence, this rate schedule is usually ignored in discussions of the
marriage penalty.
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B. Marriage Penalty and the Social Science Literature
Very little social science literature examines the precise topic of
income differences between married partners by race. However, several
articles address general patterns of racial differences in labor force
participation among married women. That literature contains two critical
findings.
(1) Black wives participate in the labor force at a greater
rate than white wives. Accordingly, there are more
dual wage earner families among blacks than whites.
It follows that black families are less likely to receive
the biggest marriage bonuses, which go to single wage
earner families.
(2) Black wives earn incomes much closer to their black
husbands' incomes than white wives make in
comparison to their white husbands, especially at
higher income levels. This means that black couples
are more likely to suffer the most substantial marriage
penalties.
Joyce Beckett reviewed nine studies of social science databases
comparing black and white wives during various periods from 1960 to
1976.149
She found that black wives were more eager to work than
white wives and black husbands were more eager than white husbands to
have their wives work."5' The more educated the black husband, the
more likely he was to have a working black wife.1"' Even children did
not negatively affect black wives' participation in the labor force.152 In
contrast, working white wives tended to have husbands with lower socioeconomic status and with greater than average periods of unemployment.
Beckett concluded that these black/white differences in wives'
participation in the labor force could not be fully attributed to any other
demographic characteristics other than race.' 53
149.
(1976).
150.
151.
152.
153.

Joyce 0. Beckett, Working Wives: A Racial Comparison, 21 Soc. WORK 463
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

465.
464-65.
466.
464.
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Writing in the same period, Duran Bell used a regression analysis to
explain differences in black/white wife labor force participation."
Bell's work confirmed that black families with working black wives were
the most "stable and better educated black families, whereas the white
working wife emerged from the lesser educated, poorer, and more
unstable white families." 155 James Smith looked at how female labor
force participation affected individual families' economic well being as
well as income distributions across families."
Comparing black and
white wives, Smith found that black wives' incomes moved their families
above the black average income while white wives' wages tended to move
their families up to the white average income. 57 The tendency of black
wives to push black family income into higher tax brackets is just the type
of behavior that triggers bigger marriage penalties.
More recently, in 1990, James Geschwender and Rita Carroll-Seguin
came to similar conclusions: "African-American families have been able
to achieve a standard of living comparable to that of the middle-class
European-Americans because African-American wives have been far more
likely than European-American wives to work, and to work fulltime."158 According to Geschwender and Carroll-Seguin, there are
proportionably more dual earner families among blacks than whites.
Their main concern was recent social science studies claiming that blacks
They objected to this
have "closed the economic gap" with whites.'
assertion by countering that black economic improvement reflects black
wives' labor force participation.
Even though the racial discrepancy in the number of working wives
is decreasing, Geschwender and Carroll-Seguin conclude that working
black wives contribute a higher portion of family income than do working
white wives. For example, in 1987 the average dual income white family
made $41,023. With the husband alone in the work force, the average
white family income was $27,394 or only $13,629 (49%) less. On the
other hand, the average dual income for a black family was $33,333, and
black family income was $16,822 when only the husband worked. This
154.
Duran Bell, Why Participation Rates of Black and White Wives Differ, 9 J.
HUM. REsouRcEs 465, 466 (1974).
Id. at 472.
155.
James P. Smith, The Distributionof Family Earnings, 87 J. POL. ECON. 5163
156.
(1979).
157.
Id. at 5172.
James A. Geschwender & Rita Carroll-Seguin, Exploding the Myth of
158.
African-American Progress, 15 SIONS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & Soc'Y 285, 298 (1990).
Id. at 285.
159.
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contrast suggests that black wives make on average $16,511 a year, or
98.2% of black husbands' income."W

Thus, the social science literature indicates that black working wives
are more likely to widen the disparity between the middle and lower
classes in the black community, while working white wives often lessen
income dispersion in their communities. Rather than pulling their families
from the lower classes to the middle class, black wives pull their families

from the lower rungs of the middle class to its higher rungs, where the
families suffer the marriage penalties that result from two spouses earning
similar incomes.'
C. Results of Our Study
Previous studies have not had tax consequences primarily in mind
and hence have not conducted a couple by couple analysis of income
difference. Using a sample called the PUMS Couples File drawn from
the 1980 United States Census data, we constructed a variable that
measured the proportion of family income earned by the wife for married

couples with incomes that triggered the marriage penalty.

We were

uncertain, however, about what combined income triggered the penalty
because in 1980 Section 1 rate schedules were radically different from
those in place today. Furthermore, the census data reports total income,
not taxable income, and we could not know what deductions, personal
exemptions, etc., particular taxpayers used to calculate taxable income.
In the end we constructed our variable only for couples with a combined
160.
Id. at 294.
161.
Quester and Green set about showing that there are no significant differences
in labor force participation rates among black married women and white married women.
Aline 0. Quester & William H. Green, The Labor Market Experience of Black and White
Wives in the Sixties and Seventies, 66 Soc. Scl. Q. 854 (1985). They posit that previous
studies that showed black/white differences were flawed because husband's income was
presumed to have a linear relationship to wife's labor force participation. Instead, Quester
and Green find that there are threshold levels of family income at which the slope of the
line increases or decreases. Id. at 865. Controlling for the wife's education, health,
residence, age, presence of preschool-age children and the previously mentioned nonlinearity, Quester and Green find few racial differences in wife's labor force participation.
Id. Nonetheless, the authors do make one observation which is relevant to our study, and,
in our view, discredits their own conclusions. Quester and Green find that the threshold
levels of family income have differing effects for blacks and whites:
The negative effect of income on market participation for black wives appears
only after [family] income has reached a fairly high level. The pattern for
white wives is one of participation probabilities slowly increasing until income
reaches the first threshold, fairly sharply decreasing until the second threshold,
and thereafter more slowly decreasing.
Id. at 862.
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income exceeding $30,350 in 1980 dollars. We are confident that we
have identified a population that would be subject to the marriage penalty
if their incomes were adjusted for inflation and if 1995 rate schedules

were applied to them."
The design of our variable left us with a sample of 17,578 married
women of which 5884 were black. In this sample the average black wife
earned 29.5% of her family's income, while the average white wife
earned only 18% of her family's income. This percentage difference

indicates that within this sub-sample, black couples were more likely to
be subject to marriage penalties, and at any given combined income, to
higher marriage penalties."

We used a regression analysis to assure ourselves that the racial
differences in this data are not solely byproducts of socio-economic and
demographic differences between blacks and whites. As shown in Table

M in the Appendix, we found that race was a highly significant predictor
of a wife's proportion of family income even when we accounted for such
other variables as the husband's income and the education of the

wife.'"
D. The Black Congress and the Marriage Penalty
Section 1 rate schedules create both marriage bonuses and marriage

penalties, depending on the combined taxable income of a couple and its
distribution between them. The social science evidence demonstrates
quite convincingly that black couples are less, likely than white couples to

enjoy a marriage bonus, because married black women are more likely to
be in the labor force. And because black wives generally contribute a
162.
That is, if income kept up with inflation, the population in this sample would
have combined incomes in excess of $60,000, yielding taxable incomes well within the
income ranges yielding marriage penalties when the income is split between each spouse.
163.
We could not determine from census data what unmarried persons were living
together in a single household. Thus, we could not determine which couples were
avoiding the marriage penalty by avoiding marriage while in all other respects living
together as a couple. It is possible, of course, that blacks are more likely than whites to
so behave. We do know that blacks are more likely to be single. In 1991, 43.1% of
black men and 38.4% of black women were married, while 62.4% of white men and
59.0% of white women were married. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, THE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1991). But
we do not know what proportion of single whites and blacks live with another person as
a couple.
All we can conclude from our data, therefore, is that within the population of
married couples, blacks are more likely to suffer from the marriage penalty than whites.
We do not know whether the apparent racial skewing of the marriage penalty would
disappear if we were able to examine all couples, married and unmarried.
164.
The wife's education is a proxy for her potential earning capacity.
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higher percentage to the total family income, black couples are more
likely to suffer a marriage penalty, and a higher marriage penalty, than
white couples. Regression equations confirm that these correlations do
not disappear when controls are introduced for education, husbands'
incomes, and other possible race neutral factors which might account for
black wives' high participation in the labor force and high contribution to
total family income.
What would a Black Congress do with this information? We will
discuss three possible actions. The simplest solution would be to adopt
a one rate schedule for all individuals. Married couples would each file
separate returns and each partner's taxable income would be taxed at the
same rate at which it would have been taxed if they were single. There
would be no separate schedule for heads of households, nor would there
be a marriage bonus for couples with only one wage earner, regardless
of income. Moreover, there would be no marriage penalty for couples
with two wage earners, regardless of the percentage of combined income
that the lower income spouse contributed.
This reform has been previously advocated for reasons of gender
equity." 6 We believe that we are the first to suggest it for reasons of
racial equity. Though simple, this solution might be unacceptable because
it would eliminate the marriage bonus. Longstanding congressional policy
favors use of the tax code to encourage marriage and to encourage women
to be primarily homemakers."M Though we disagree with this policy,
a Black Congress might want to keep these incentives in place. Some
blacks receive a marriage bonus, of course, even if a disproportionate
amount of the benefits go to whites. A Black Congress may decide that
there are social gains from women working mostly in the home, such as
better quality childcare.
A Black Congress would still want to eliminate the marriage penalty
while preserving the marriage bonus. A simple approach would be to
provide for elective filing status by married taxpayers on each year's
165.
Pamela B. Gann,Abandoning Marital StatusAs a Factor inAllocating Income
Tax Burdens, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1, 67 (1980); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and
the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63,
108 (1993) (arguing that "[a]system that treats each person as a separate taxable unit is
more equitable, more consistent with basic tax principles, more efficient, and ultimately

better able to accomplish social family goals").
166.

See Nancy Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1996).
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return.167 Married taxpayers would have the choice to file as single
people or as a married couple with a joint return.
A more radical alternative would be to allow both married and single
couples to get the best tax result depending on their changing income
combinations, by filing as two single persons or as married couple filing
jointly, regardless of actual marital status. We know that blacks are more
likely to be single than whites.'" We do not know whether there are
more black than white couples who are living together but unmarried and
who would enjoy a marriage bonus if they did marry. But enough black
couples may be in this situation that a Black Congress would want to
ensure that single working couples never pay more taxes than married
working couples.
This more radical solution to the marriage bonus/penalty problem
might also find favor in a gay Congress because gay people often live
together as couples but are not yet provided the option of legal marriage.
Under such a system, some method would be necessary for verifying
relationships between unmarried persons as satisfying the criteria for the
filing status election. The current controversy over providing benefits to
the partners of gay employees may be of help in this regard. As states
and cities begin to develop definitions and registration procedures for gay
and other single couples, the federal government can follow suit and
piggy back on the expanded state definitions in allowing elective tax filing
status.
VI. CONCLUSION

Our article explores the critical race theory tradition that racial
subordination infects virtually all American institutions. We have tested
this hypothesis against the Internal Revenue Code. We have presented
evidence that members of the black community receive, on average, fewer
of the tax benefits we have studied than the average member of the white
community. Our evidence is strongest with respect to the tax provisions
we discussed in our wealth section. Blacks have less of the type of
investment wealth which benefits from the realization requirement and
special rates for capital gains. Blacks also receive fewer gifts and
inheritances, a form of tax free accessions to wealth. When blacks do
have wealth, they are more likely to invest in assets that are not tax
favored, such as vehicles. Blacks do invest in homes, the primary asset
167.
In a different context, the Internal Revenue Service has issued proposed
regulations that would allow business entities, other than those automatically classified as
corporations for federal tax purposes, to choose their classification. IRS Regulations, 71
TAx NoTEs 881 (1996).
168.
See supra note 163.
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for most American families, but black homes are on average less valuable
and generally appreciate at a slower rate than white homes. As a result,
the homeownership tax benefits, particularly the deductibility of home
mortgage interest and property taxes, are more beneficial to whites than
blacks.
The results of our study of black/white differences in the tax benefits
associated with employee benefits is more mixed. We found that, once
the data is controlled with appropriate socio-economic and demographic
factors, blacks and whites participate equally in employer provided health
plans."i
However, fewer blacks than whites participate in employer
provided pension plans and 401(k) plans, which enjoy very substantial tax
deferral advantages.
Section 1 rate schedules provide bonuses to some couples and
penalties to other couples for being married. Because of extensive
participation in the work force by black women, blacks are less likely to
enjoy marriage bonuses and more likely to incur marriage penalties. This
relationship between race and marriage bonuses and penalties remains
after controlling for family income and other relevant economic variables.
Much of our analysis used regression equations to control for
relevant demographic and socio-economic status (the independent
variables) in an attempt to support the "null hypothesis"-that race does
not matter-by trying to explain variance in the enjoyment of tax benefits
(the dependent variable) as reflecting the influence of causes other than
race. In nearly every instance we failed to find support for the null
hypothesis because race remained a statistically significant predictor of
enjoyment of tax benefits in our regression equations. However,
regression equations are only as good as the selection of the independent
variable candidates.
Another researcher might select different
independent variables and succeed in constructing an equation in which
race is not a statistically significant predictor of enjoyment of these tax
benefits. Until and if such a regression is created, however, we think our
regressions are the best evidence available.
Before we go further, we must repeat two caveats we made in our
introduction. First, because we have studied only some provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code, we make no claim that the Internal Revenue Code
as a whole subordinates black economic interests. Further study of other
provisions may discover some which favor blacks over whites. However,
we do believe that this study demonstrates the utility of our methodology.
Further, we have studied some of the most significant tax benefits
169.
And because of the non-discrimination provisions in the Internal Revenue
Code, we presume that medical plans have approximately equal value for all employees,
regardless of class, gender or race. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
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applicable to the individual income tax. If the tax benefits studied in our
wealth section and the benefits associated with employer provided pension
plans are skewed as substantially to whites as our analysis suggests, the
entire Code is likely skewed in the favor of whites."
Second, we make no accusations of discriminatory intent. We
suggest that the Code reflects systematic black political
underrepresentation in the halls of power. As a result, black people are
not in the consciousness of Congress as it enacts the Internal Revenue
Code. Indeed, we suspect many legislators will be taken aback by our
evidence of racial skewing in the distribution of tax benefits. We have
used our metaphor of a Black Congress to emphasize how a tax code
focused on the economic interests of blacks might look.
We suggest that a Black Congress would look favorably on a number
of radical changes in the Internal Revenue Code. We repeat only the
most prominent here. We have advocated changing the current
deductions for home mortgage interest and real property taxes into credits
that diminish as income rises.' 1 We suggested the elimination of both
the capital gains rate and the realization requirement for the taxation of
gain on many kinds of appreciated property." We proposed changes
in the non-discrimination requirement for employer provided pension
plans to require parity in dollar contributions for all employees, rather
than parity in percentage of earnings. " Finally, we recommended that
a single rate schedule apply to all taxpayers, married or single, to
eliminate both the marriage bonus and the marriage penalty. 74
Anyone who wished to shift more of the tax burden away from lower
income persons and towards the more wealthy would tend to favor these
proposals. Given the general economic situation of blacks in America,
that such persons would make political alliance with those taking a blackoriented view of the Internal Revenue Code should not be surprising.
However, we want to stress once again that we have provided evidence
that the Code provisions we have studied disfavor blacks as a group, even
holding income and other measures of socio-economic status constant.
Thus, even high income blacks are less likely to benefit from employer
170.
Estimates of the "tax expenditure" budget consistently indicate that the two
largest "tax expenditures"-that is, lost revenue because of deviations from the Glenshaw
Glass definition of income-are the deductibility of interest on home mortgages and the
exclusion of employer contributions to pension plans. See KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra
note 122, at 26-27.
171.
See supra p. 786-87.
172.
See supra p. 782.
173.
See supra p. 789-91.
174.
See supra pp. 798-99.
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provided pensions and more likely to suffer marriage penalties than are
whites with equivalent incomes. 75
All tax benefits as we have defined them-deviations from a
comprehensive income tax base as defined in Glenshaw Glass-have some
underlying public policy goal. Sometimes that goal is to achieve a more
easily administered income tax, as reflected in the realization principle.
Sometime that goal is to provide an incentive for particular lifestyles,
such as getting married, investing in 401(k) plans or capital assets,
owning homes, etc. If blacks are not responding in sufficient numbers to
these incentives, one possible response is that the tax benefits should be
made stronger to provide even greater incentives for the desired
behaviors.
Our response to this argument 76 is that the social science literature
we introduced in this article clearly confirms that in many cases blacks
have no access to tax favored choices. Black homes appreciate less,
partly because of widespread discrimination in housing markets. Blacks
do not enjoy marriage bonuses and suffer marriage penalties, in part
because employment discrimination prevents black husbands from earning
as much as white husbands. Most outstandingly, the glaring discrepancies
in black and white wealth and inheritances make it almost impossible for
most blacks to invest in capital assets and in other tax favored ways. The
country could and should adopt programs that would improve the ability
of blacks to make lifestyle decisions that are now tax favored. No-one
can doubt that black poverty is a product of our country's unfortunate
racial history-centuries of slavery followed by de jure and de facto racial
segregation. It is a history that needs to be corrected, but it will not be
corrected overnight.
In the meantime, the Internal Revenue Code should not perpetuate
and aggravate the inequities between blacks and whites. The importance
of achieving public policy goals must be balanced against any racially
skewing effects of these provisions. If other types of tax provisions can
achieve public policy goals without skewing the Code against blacks,
175.
See supra p. 786-87, 796-97.
176.
An alternative response is that lifestyle choices are constantly in flux and no
more so than in the past three decades. Blacks have often said that we are the canaries
in the mine of American society. This was true for drug use which was originally
confined to the black community and which has spread throughout our society. It was
also true for illegitimate births which are now so prevalent in all races. It is true in terms
of married women working outside the home, which was virtually unheard of among
whites years ago although it was quite common among blacks. The lifestyles that blacks
lead today may be the lifestyles that whites lead tomorrow. If whites want to keep the
Internal Revenue Code best serving their interests, they must pay attention to how the
Code ill serves blacks.
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those other provisions certainly are preferable. If legislators cannot
accommodate both public policy goals and black/white equity, then they
will have to make hard choices. But even analysts who cannot support
our rather radical proposals for the Internal Revenue Code need to
address the question of the racially skewed impact of the tax benefits we
have studied. Ignoring the impact that the Internal Revenue Code has on
black welfare is a tradition that must stop.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix has three sections. Part I contains the tables referred to
in the text. Part II contains a description of the databases used to
construct the tables. Part III contains a discussion of the controls we used
in doing the regressions reported in the tables.
PART I: Tables
In each table we report a regression coefficient (b) and a measure of
statistical significance (t). Regression coefficients are estimates of the
change in the dependent variable for a unit change in a given independent
variable (e.g., age or income). For example, in Table A, the coefficient
for Education is 1,716.55. This means that for each additional grade
completed by the respondent, the amount of gifts received over a given
period increased by an average of $1,716.65. The preceding example is
based on an ordinary least squares regression. However, when dependent
variables are binary or zero-sum variables, for technical reasons we have
used logistic regressions. The interpretation of the regression coefficient
(b) is not as straightforward in those circumstances.
t is a standard measure of statistical significance used in regression
equations. It is dependent on a number of factors, particularly the size
of the sample and the amount of variability within it. In the tables we
identify the independent variables that are significantly correlated with the
dependent variable with 95% or 99% confidence by printing the results
in italics.
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TABLE A
Race and Total Net Worth

b

VARIABLE

I

Age

1388.35

41.86

Region (1 =South)

1144.38

0.79

Family Income (Monthly/100)

2583.58

81.47

Education (Highest grade attended)

1716.65

20.83

Marital Status (1 =Married)

-6570.63

-4.48

Race (1 =White)

13761.21

7.17

Data Source: 1984 Survey of Income and ProgramParticipation-Wave4
n = 52,223: Italics indicate statisticalsigniflcance with 99% confidence.
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TABLE B
Race and Holdings of Stocks and Mutual Funds

VARIABLE

$
b

Amounts

Proportion
b

t

Children in
(1 =yes)

-9714.11

-0.55

-0.039

-0.85

Respondents
Age

214.74

13.19

0.001

22.24

High School

2063.8

2.98

0.021

11.15

College Grad
(I =yes)

2403.28

3.18

0.03

15.4

Southern
Residence

615.09

0.94

-0.003

-1.69

-3078.96

-5.22

-0.02

-12.92

492.28

34.08

0.001

22.67

1096.02

1.21

NH

Grad (1=yes)

(I =yes)
Marital Statu
(1 =married)

Monthly
Family
Income/ 00

Race

(1=white)

I

0.019
I

_

7.33
I

Data Source: 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation-Wave4
Italics indicate statisticalsignicancewith 95 % conience.
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TABLE C

Race and Non Owner Occupied Real Estate

VARIABLE

$ Amounts
b

Proportion
b

t

-12165

-0.99

-. 075.

-1.09

246.33

21.55

0.001

16.66

High School
Grad (I =yee)

3110.38

6.39

0.019

6.48

College Grad
=y_ )

4210.69

7.93

0.025

8.49

Southern
Residence
( =yes)

450.28

0.98

0.004

1.41

Marital Status

-697.21

-1.68

0.002

0.96

464.28

45.78

0.001

20.55

1947.99

3.05

0.014

3.42

Children in
HH (1 =yes)

Respondents

Age

(

(1=married)
Monthly
Family
Income/100

Race

(1=white)
Data Source: 1984 Survey of Income and Pworam Participation-Wave4
Italics indicate statisticalsignificance with 95 % confidence.
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TABLE D
Race and Equity in Vehicles

VARIABLE

$ Amounts
b

Propotion
t

b

-3832.06

-2.44

-0.328

-2.65

Respondents Age

12.21

8.39

-0.007

-61.87

High School Grad
(I =y-)

1173.08

62.01

-0.036

-6.78

99.73

1.48

-0.004

-0.83

226.24

3.88

-0.014

-2.89

Marital Stabs
(I =married)

774.19

14.68

-0.008

-1.74

Monthly Family
Income/100

106.3

82.34

-0.004

-42.07

Race (I =white)

1560.92

19.2

-0.04

-5.61

Children in HH

(1=yes)

College Grad

(=yes)
Southern Residence

(1=yes)

Data Source: 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation- Wave 4
Italics indicate statistical signocance with 95 % confidence.
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TABLE E
Value of Gifts Received

VARIABLE

b

Age

-12.16

-1.75

Family Income

-0.01

-1.87

303.47

1.28

-9.33

-0.04

Education

968.96

-1.89

Race (1 =White)

761.03

2.43

Southern
Residence
(1 =South)

Marital Status

(1=Married)

Data Source: 1988 NationalSurvey of Familiesand Households
n = 9.660: Italics indicate statisticalsignificance with 95% confidence.

TABLE F
Inheritance Received

b

I

Age

172.01

8.51

Family Income

-0.03

-4.12

-787.38

-1.14

-379.08

-0.53

-16.5

-1.83

3915.82

4.29

VARIABLE

Southern Residence

(1=South)
Marital Status (1 =Married)

Education

Race (1 =White)

Data Source: 1988 NationalSurvey of Families and Households
n = 9.660: Italics indicate statisticalsignificance with 95% confidence.
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TABLE G
Generational Transfer of Wealth

VARIABLE

b

-0.28

-1.68

Marital Status (1 =Married)

54023.97

3.49

Southern Residence
(1=South)

-18437.79

-1.14

-320.45

-1.86

45688.43

2.1

Family Income

Education

Race (1 =Wthite)

Data Source: 1988 NationalSurvey of Families and Households
n = 1,686: Italics indicate statisticalsignificance with 95 % confidence.

TABLE H
Race and Home Ownership

VARIABLE

b

I

Total Family Income

0.04

19

Age in Years

0.04

13

Age (categorical)

0.26

2

UrbanlNon-UrbanResidence

-0.2

-3

-0

-1

Marital Status

1.01

15

Race (B/W)

0.36

4

Constant

-3.1

-17

Highest Grade Completed

Data Source: 1988 NationalSurvey of Households and Families
Italics indicate statisticalsignifcant at the .01 level.
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TABLE I
Race and Home Equity

$

VARIABLE

Prponklm

Amouns
b

b

i

3.36

0.441

1.91

Children in
111 (I -e)__

21950.3

Repmond-

576.93

53.95

a ow

Wh Schol
Grad
(I -Y_)

8395.24

142

4.005

O.86

COllegs
Grad
0 -Y-)

22& 3

451

4051

-496

Souther

-1562.5

-3.64

0.013

2.36

5.38

_

_

_

_

_

41.97

(1 -Y-)

Marital
Slaim

591.58

1.53

0026

Mow*l

815.08

9.49

0.002

9641.68

16.13

20L99

112001A

Ra
(I

-whis.)

I______

Data Source: 1984 Siawy hcormeand Ptegora Pdldpadon-Wve
lluac Lbdmtro suddof sIdflauce WfA 95% carolence.

0.96

0.007
_______

______

4
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TABLE J
Race and Employer Provided Health Insurance

VARIABLE

b

I

RACE

0.1097

0.92

TENURE2

0.0969

16.17

EDUC

0.0801

5.33

FT

2.5184

31.38

PROFMAN

0.0576

0.71

METRO

0.0811

1.08

SOUTH

0.1433

2.07

UNIONMEM

1.0765

10.02

FIRM SIZE

0.2337

3.48

BRA CKMT2

0.845

6.38

CONSTANT

.2.7432

Data Source: 1988 Current Population Survey - Employee Benefits
n = 10,721: Italics indicatestatisticalsignificance with 95% confidence.
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TABLE K
Race and 401(k) Plans

b

t

RACE

0.3913

4.03

TENURE2

0.042

14.48

EDUC

0.1439

11.89

FT

1.3522

9.78

PROFMAN

0.2294

3.82

METRO

0.0976

1.65

SOUTH

-0.1853

-3.56

UNIONMEM

-0.3415

-5.53

FIRM SIZE

0.6217

11.14

BRA CKET2

0.3982

6.67

PUBLIC

-0.3854

-6.24

CONSTANT

-5.7229

VARIABLE

Data Source: 1988 Current Population Survey - Employee Benefits
n = 10,836: Italics indicate statistical significance with 95% confidence.
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TABLE L
Race and Employer-Provided Pension Plans

VARIABLE

b
0.2664

2.35

0.2152
OEMJRE2

25.93

EDUC

0.055

3.43

FT

1.903

17.99

PROFMAN

0.13

1.57

METRO

-0.139

1.78

SOUTH

-0.0505

-0.74

UNIONMEM

0.78

7.91

FIRM SIZE

0.0372

0.52

BRA CK T2

0.6555

5.76

PUBUC

0.7589

8.93

CONSTANT

-2.8518

RACE

Data Source: 1988 Currem Popuitaon Srvey - Employee Benefts
n = 8,952: ItalicU ndicate utatsdcal signiftcance with 95 % confidence.
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TABLE M
Race and Proportion of Family Income Earned by Wife

VARIABLE

b

WIFRACE

0.051

22.928

PREVMAR

0.018

6.659

HUSNOWRK

-1.241

-0.134

EDUCW

0.015

39.458

SOUTH

0.004

1.659

CHILDREN

-0.009

-9.988

URBAN

0.013

3.973

OTHERINC

-0.009

-128.295

PREKKID

-0.014

-4.765

(Constan)

0.286

40.931

Data source: U.S. Bureau of Census, PUMS Couples Fide (1980)
n = 17,578: Italics indicatestatisticalsinificance th 99% confidence.
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Part II: Databases
We used four databases in our data analyses: the Survey of Income
and ProgramParticipation(SIPP), the National Survey of Families and
Households (NSFH), the U.S. Census May 1988 Current Population
Survey (CPS), and the 1980 Census, PUMS Couples File. In this part of
the Appendix, we provide some information about each database.
The Survey of Income and ProgramParticipation(SIPP)was begun
in 1984 by the Bureau of Census.'" It is a large, random field survey
of the U.S. population designed to track entry into and exit from
participation in various government funded social programs. The large
number of households in the sample and the range and depth of questions
concerning demographic detail and work experience allows an expanded
analysis of black-white differences.
A SIPP panel consists of households which are interviewed every
four months during a two-and-a-half-year period. A new panel is
introduced every year. The SIPP database is premised on basic
demographic questions that are repeated at each interview and topical
"waves" that are only asked once. The repeated questions concern basic
demographic and social characteristics for each member of the household
including labor force activity and types and amounts of income. The
more in-depth "waves" cover such topics as "assets" and "government
program participation." We used Wave 4 of the 1987 Panel to examine
wealth, race and taxation.' 78
The National Survey of Familiesand Households (NSFH) consists of
interviews with a national sample of 13,017 respondents. The field work
began in March 1987 and was concluded in May 1988. The survey
includes a main sample of 9643 respondents who represent the
noninstitutional United States population aged nineteen and older. The
remaining 3374 respondents are the spouses or cohabiting partners of the
main respondents. In addition, to obtain a sample of minority groups that
was large enough to support inferences made from the data, several
population groups were double sampled.
One adult per household was randomly selected to be the primary
respondent. A shorter self-administered questionnaire was given to the
spouse or cohabiting partner of the primary respondent. Several portions
177.
For a more complete description of the SIPP database and its use in studying
wealth, see OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 55-65.
178.
Wave 4 of the 1987 Panel includes information on assets and liabilities. The
assets covered include: savings accounts, stocks, business equity, mutual funds, bonds,
Keogh and IRA accounts, and equity in homes and vehicles. Wave 4 does not cover
pension funds; a problem for our study of employee benefits.
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of the main interview were self-administered to facilitate the collection of
sensitive information and to ease the flow of the interview.
The end result is a data set that is large enough and broad enough
draw inferences from. Of particular interest for us is the 3026 blacks in
the NSFH sample. In our study we have drawn on data from the NSFH
sample about work patterns and income sources, home ownership,
inheritance and gifts.
In order to study race differences in employee benefit plan
participation, we used the U.S. Census May 1988 Current Population
Survey of Employee Benefits. This data set includes information on
wages, industry, occupation, union status, region, education, marital
status, and age, found in the May Current Population Survey conducted
by the Census every year, but in addition includes information on
employee benefits, firm size, and tenure with employer. The CPS Survey
of Employee Benefits does not include information on the dollar value of
benefits available.
We used the 1980 Census, PUMS Couples File to study the income
of couples and to ascertain the likelihood of receiving a marriage bonus
or penalty. The File consists of data taken from a random sample of
decennial census respondents who are asked to complete a very detailed
questionnaire. The PUMS Couples File is compiled by the Census from
this data.
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Part III: Controls

Table N shows the controls other than race that we have employed
in our regressions.
TABLE N
Controls Used in Logistic Regressions
MARRIAGE PENALTY

Race

EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS
Race

HOMEOWNERSHIP

WEALTH

Race

Race

Income

Income

Income

Income

Education

Education

Education

Education

Region

Region

Region

Region

Areatype

Areatype

Arcatype

Previous Marriage

Marital Status

Marital Status

Age

Age

Ckildren/Young children
Tenure in Job
Husband's labor force
participation

Various aapects
of employment

We discuss each of these controls, beginning with those we used
most frequently in our analyses.
EDUCATION. Because socio-economic status is largely dependent
on education, 1" we included some measure of education in all
equations. In trying to tease out the effects of education on the marriage
penalty tax rates, we were most interested in wives' education because the
labor force participation of married women is largely a function of their
educational attainment, and the married women's labor force participation
is the factor that qualifies couples for the marriage penalty. In other
situations we measured the educational attainment of the person
responding to the interview.
INCOME. Another variable that reflects socio-economic status is
income." In all our equations we employed some measure of income to
179.
180.

OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 70.
O'HARE, supra note 54, at 1.
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to control for the possibility that race differences in tax benefits are a
function of income rather than race.
In the case of the marriage penalty, we used a measure which
represents all family income not earned by the wifeOTHERINC-because some married women might work more than
others because the other income source for their families is inadequate.
In the analysis of homeownership and wealth, all family income is
measured. In our analysis of employee benefits, we classified respondents
as high income (over $35,000) or low income (BRACKET2 in Tables J,
K &L).
REGION. We controlled in each instance for region because blacks
are most heavily concentrated in the South, a significantly poorer part of
As a result, observed racial disparities might actually
the country.'
reflect regional differences.
AGE. We included a measure of age in wealth and homeownership
because increased age is directly related to increased wealth and
Because the black population is significantly
homeownership. 1
younger and has shorter life expectancies than the white population,"
observed racial differences in wealth and homeownership may be merely
a function of age rather than race. In our employee benefits analysis, we
controlled for tenure in the job, which is also related to age. In our
marriage penalty analysis, however, we did not control for age.
MARITAL STATUS. Marriage joins together individuals and their
incomes and wealth. Accordingly, married people may be more likely to
own homes and other assets than unmarried people. Because whites
marry at a much higher rate than blacks,'" we controlled for marital
status when looking at homes and wealth.
While we did not have to control for current marital status when
studying the marriage penalty, we did control for whether a respondent
had been previously married. We believe that it is possible that
previously married wives are more impressed with the fragility of
marriage and more concerned about developing a career as a source of
economic security.
We did not control for marital status in our analysis of employee
benefits.
AREATYPE. Here we consider whether the respondent lives in an
urban or non-urban area. Area type is important for the marriage penalty
rate because married women in urban areas are more likely to work than
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 14.
REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE COLOR LINE AND THE

QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 46 (1987).

184.

Id. at 170.
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married women in non-urban areas."' For homes, area type is
important because housing in urban areas is more scarce than in nonurban areas." 8 Because blacks are overwhelmingly urban dwellers, " '
area type may be more important to home ownership than race.
Area type does not appear in our wealth or employee benefit
analysis. Although rural people tend to have lower incomes, we have
already controlled for income.
EMPLOYMENT. The decisions of wives to enter the paid labor
force may be dependent on the stability of their husbands' work. In our
analysis of marriage bonuses and penalties, we included HUSNOWRK,
a measure of the number of weeks in the past year that a wife's husband
did not work.
In our analysis of employee benefits, we included a number of
variables related to the respondent's employment, including full or part
time, public or private employer, firm size for private employers, white
or blue collar occupation, and union status.
CHILDREN. The number and age of children in a family influences
married women's labor force participation."' In our study of the
marriage penalty, we use PREKKID and CHILDREN to measure the
effect that the presence of preschool age children, and the effect that the
presence of each additional child (regardless of age), respectively has on
a wife's labor force participation. We did not control for children in our
other analyses.

185.
See id. at 239 (showing that a higher percentage of the black and white
metropolitan populations work than the non-metropolitan populations).
186.
See Heather Timmons, Big Lenders Aiding Push in Bronx Homeownership,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 20, 1996, at 15 (citing a study finding that the "shortage of affordable
urban housing is dangerous").
187.
FARLEY & ALLEN, supra note 183, at 135-36.
188.
PHYLLIS A. WALLACE, BLACK WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE 34-36 (1980).
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